James Henry Daniel was convicted of trafficking in cocaine based on evidence found pursuant to a consent search of the vehicle Daniel was driving after he was stopped for a routine traffic offense. On appeal Daniel did not contest the legality of the initial traffic stop but instead argued that the officer improperly expanded the scope of the stop and that Daniel’s consent to search was the coerced result of an illegal seizure. Relying upon State v. Sims , 248 Ga. App. 277 546 SE2d 47 2001, the Court of Appeals rejected Daniel’s arguments. Daniel v. State , 260 Ga. App. 732 580 SE2d 682 2003. We granted certiorari to address whether, in light of Padron v. State , 254 Ga. App. 265 562 SE2d 244 2002 and State v. Hanson , 243 Ga. App. 532 532 SE2d 715 2000, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the denial of Daniel’s motion to suppress. 1. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention. United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 551 100 SC 1879, 64 LE2d 497 1980. “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 116 SC 1769, 135 LE2d 89 1996. An investigative detention usually must “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500 103 SC 1319, 75 LE2d 229 1983 plurality opinion. The officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. See Royer , supra, 460 U.S. at 500. Ferris v. Maryland , 735 A2d 491, 499 Md. 1999. See also Padron v. State , supra, 254 Ga. App. at 268; State v. Hanson , supra, 243 Ga. App. at 540-541.
Once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, it does not automatically follow that any further detention for questioning is unconstitutional. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has clarified that lengthening the detention for further questioning beyond that related to the initial stop is permissible in two circumstances. First, the officer may detain the driver for questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has occurred or is occurring. Cit. Second, further questioning unrelated to the initial stop is permissible if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter. Cit. United States v. Hunnicutt , 135 F3d 1345, 1349 10th Cir. 1998; United States v. Pruitt , 174 F3d 1215, 1220 11th Cir. 1998. Accord Ohio v. Robinette , 519 U.S. 33 117 SC 417, 136 LE2d 347 1996. Thus, we hold that a law enforcement officer’s continued questioning of a vehicle’s driver and passengers outside the scope of a valid traffic stop passes muster under the Fourth Amendment either when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity or when the valid traffic stop has de-escalated into a consensual encounter.
