E.D. Wilson, Jr. Husband brought this divorce action against Brenda Copeland Wilson Wife. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment and divorce decree, resolving several issues including equitable division of property and alimony. We granted a discretionary appeal from this final divorce decree pursuant to this Court’s pilot project. See Wright v. Wright , 277 Ga. 133 587 SE2d 600 2003. 1. When Wife’s counsel requested leave to make her closing argument, the trial court refused, stating, “Y’all have about worn me out. I don’t think I want to hear any closing arguments.” Wife contends that this denial of the right to closing argument is reversible error.
“Courts around the country are split as to whether there is an absolute right to closing argument in civil cases. . . . There are at least three general approaches.” In re Emileigh F. , 724 A2d 639, 643 III Md. 1999. See also Anno., 38 ALR2d 1396, § § 4, 5. In some jurisdictions, the right is constitutional and absolute, while in others, the matter is entirely discretionary in civil, non-jury trials. In re Emileigh F. , supra. Still other courts take an intermediate approach, holding that, as a matter of non-constitutional common law, the right to closing argument exists even in civil, non-jury trials, but may be precluded when no factual issues exist or when the parties waive the opportunity. In re Emileigh F. , supra. Georgia takes this intermediate position, at least where, as here, the issue is raised with respect to the main trial, and not merely an interlocutory proceeding. Madison v. Montgomery , 206 Ga. 199 3 56 SE2d 292 1949 bench trial; Early & Lane v. Oliver & Norton , 63 Ga. 11, 18 2 1879. Compare Jolly v. Catoosa County Bd. of Educ. , 171 Ga. 193 2 154 SE 788 1930. Under the intermediate approach, the right to closing argument may be limited with respect to time, as in OCGA § 9-10-180, and content so as to preclude improper argument, but trial courts may not totally deny the right. Fuhrman v. Fuhrman , 254 NW2d 97, 101 IV N.D. 1977. Ample opportunity for full argument is certainly an important right to the parties, and if denied on the main trial of a case, civil or criminal, the denial would furnish sufficient reason, generally, for a new trial. Cits. . . . . Courts are as much bound to abstain from violating rights of practice as rights of principle. The method ordained by law to reach justice is through a trial; and no final trial is full and complete under our system, without the argument of the parties . . ., if they choose to exercise the privilege of discussion. So useful is the aid of argument in elucidating the real merits of a controversy and distinguishing the right side from the wrong, that for the sake of its business utility, aside from its bearing on the mental satisfaction of the parties, there is every reason for vindicating the privilege, as a mere privilege, in all final trials. Early & Lane v. Oliver & Norton , supra at 18-19 2 Bleckley, J..
