When Gerald Daniel Husband and Mary Daniel Wife divorced, the final decree provided that he was to pay her $3750 in “alimony” for a 36-month period, and then $1500 per month until her death or remarriage. He subsequently brought an action to modify the $3750 downward. Wife opposed the modification. She contended that only the $1500 per month obligation was terminable upon her death or remarriage and, thus, that amount was the only modifiable alimony. The trial court granted Wife’s motion to dismiss, holding that the monthly $3750 was “lump sum alimony” and non-modifiable. See OCGA § 19-6-21. “Only periodic payments of permanent alimony are subject to revision under OCGA § 19-6-19 . . . . Cit.” Nash v. Nash , 244 Ga. 749, 750 1262 SE2d 64 1979, overruled on other grounds, Winokur v. Winokur , 258 Ga. 88, 90 1 365 SE2d 94 1988. See also Dillard v. Dillard , 265 Ga. 478 458 SE2d 102 1995. Husband applied for a discretionary appeal, but his application was denied. When Husband did not pay, Wife moved that he be held in contempt. The trial court found that he was in contempt, whereupon he filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay in order that the trial court could determine in the context of the contempt proceeding the dischargeability of the $3750 in monthly “alimony.” After conducting a hearing, the trial court concluded that the obligation “was for the maintenance and support of Wife and is not dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . .” Husband filed an application for discretionary appeal, which this Court granted in order to consider the trial court’s ruling in light of the earlier determination that the obligation is not modifiable periodic alimony.
At the outset, we note the potential for some confusion resulting from the nomenclature used in our prior cases when referring to the various financial obligations owed to and by divorcing spouses in this state. “Alimony is an allowance out of one party’s estate, made for the support of the other party when living separately. It is either temporary or permanent.” OCGA § 19-6-1 a. On the other hand, ” ‘property settlement’ and ‘property division’ are terms used to refer to the determination of who owns property when its title is disputed and to the partitioning of jointly owned property. Cits.” Hargrett v. Hargrett , 242 Ga. 725, 728 2 251 SE2d 235 1978, overruled on other grounds, Stokes v. Stokes , 246 Ga. 765, 771 3 273 SE2d 169 1980. In this connection, “ alimony in gross, or in a lump sum, is in the nature of a final property settlement, and hence in some jurisdictions is not included in the term ‘alimony,’ which in its strict or technical sense contemplates money payments at regular intervals. Cits.” Cit. Hamilton v. Finch , 238 Ga. 78 1 230 SE2d 881 1976. See also Winokur v. Winokur , supra at 88 1; Bisno v. Bisno , 239 Ga. 388 236 SE2d 755 1977. “Equitable property division” differs from both alimony and the settlement of property claims involving disputed title or joint ownership. Stokes v. Stokes , supra at 767-768 3.
