Bauer v. Weeks

The statutes of limitation on the plaintiff's claims arising from the use of synthetic stucco in the construction of his house began to run on the date of substantial completion, 11 years before plaintiff filed suit and eight years before he acquired title to the property.

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This appeal from a grant of summary judgment is yet another Georgia case involving alleged defects in synthetic stucco exterior cladding. This product was used extensively in residential construction during the 1980s and 1990s, but was found to be prone to moisture migration and termite infestation.1 William Bauer filed this action against William C. Weeks over eleven years after substantial completion of the house at issue, alleging among other claims fraud and misrepresentation. Weeks moved for summary judgment on the basis of the eight-year architect’s, engineer’s and contractor’s statute of permanent repose, OCGA § 9-3-51, and the relevant tort and contract statutes of limitation, OCGA § § 9-3-24, 9-3-30. The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of the statute of repose, noting that the decisions of the Georgia courts have allowed equitable estoppel of that statute for fraud only in reference to the statute of repose for medical malpractice, OCGA § 9-3-71 b.2 In the context of this case, then, this would be a question of first impression.

But “that is a question for another day.” Colormatch Exteriors, supra, 275 Ga. at 253. We need not consider the statute of repose because the record demonstrates that Bauer did not own the property until after the statutes of limitation in both tort and contract had expired. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment under the “right for any reason” rule. Costrini v. Hansen Architects , 247 Ga. App. 136, 138 1 543 SE2d 760 2000.

Bauer v. Weeks

The statutes of limitation on the plaintiff's claims arising from the use of synthetic stucco in the construction of his house began to run on the date of substantial completion, 11 years before plaintiff filed suit and eight years before he acquired title to the property.

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