A Fulton County grand jury indicted Russell Foster on two counts of first degree vehicular homicide based upon driving under the influence and reckless driving, two counts of second degree vehicular homicide and five traffic offenses. Foster entered a guilty plea to first degree vehicular homicide based on reckless driving count 2 and reckless driving count 6, which merged into count 2 for sentencing purposes. Subsequently, Foster filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. Foster appeals, alleging his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that, as a result, his plea was not intelligently and voluntarily entered. We disagree and affirm Foster’s convictions. “A ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of such discretion.”1 When the validity of a guilty plea is challenged, the state bears the burden of showing affirmatively from the record that the defendant offered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.2 The state may do this by showing through the record of the guilty plea hearing that 1 the defendant freely and voluntarily entered the plea with 2 an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and 3 an understanding of the consequences of his plea.3
However, if the motion to withdraw is based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant who pleads guilty bears the burden of showing that his counsel erred and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.4 The trial court’s findings of fact are subject to a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.5 And there is a presumption that counsel’s advice to plead guilty fell within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct demanded of attorneys.6
