A Lowndes County jury convicted Jerry Flowers of rape, OCGA § 16-6-1. Flowers appeals, challenging the admission of evidence of a similar transaction and the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,1 the record shows the following facts. On January 12, 2001, at approximately 11:30 p.m., the victim was talking to her mother on the telephone when she heard a knock on the door. When she answered the door, Flowers pushed his way inside. The victim recognized Flowers but did not know his name. Flowers told the victim he wanted to “eat her p — —y,” and she told him to leave. The victim repeatedly and explicitly told Flowers not to touch her and that she did not want to have any sort of sexual relations with him. When Flowers refused to leave, the victim tried to call 911. Flowers began choking her and holding her out of reach of the telephone. In order to get to another telephone and call for help, the victim suggested they go to a bedroom. Flowers told the victim to disrobe and choked her when she refused. Finally, the victim complied and positioned herself on the bed as Flowers instructed. Flowers raped her in the bedroom and then left the house. The victim immediately called the police and described Flowers’ clothing: a black jacket, dark blue pants, and a black cap. Officers quickly spotted Flowers, who was wearing the clothing the victim had described, a short distance from the victim’s house. In a custodial statement which was admitted at trial, Flowers admitted having sex with the victim, although he did not know her name, but claimed it was consensual. A medical examination of the victim that night revealed the presence on the victim’s cervix of several petechiae, tiny ruptured blood vessels indicating injury from blunt force.
1. Flowers contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other bad acts, specifically, evidence that Flowers raped another woman. Although the conduct of an accused in other transactions is generally irrelevant,2 the admissibility of evidence of similar transactions is contingent upon three affirmative showings: “1 the evidence must be admitted for a proper purpose; 2 there must be sufficient evidence to establish the accused committed the independent act; and 3 there must be a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.” Citation omitted. Gardner v. State , 273 Ga. 809, 810 2 546 SE2d 490 2001.3 When reviewing the trial court’s factual findings regarding whether the State satisfied the three-prong test, we apply the clearly erroneous standard. Garrett v. State , 253 Ga. App. 779, 781 3 560 SE2d 338 2002; Mitchell v. State , 249 Ga. App. 520, 521 1 548 SE2d 469 2001. Further, the decision to admit similar transaction evidence which satisfies the three-prong test is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Jones v. State , 255 Ga. App. 609, 611 565 SE2d 915 2002.
