In this case, the State of Georgia appeals from the grant of defendant David Simmons’s motion to suppress blood alcohol test results in the State Court of Fulton County. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Simmons’s motion. The trial court found that a defendant under arrest for driving under the influence “DUI”, as here, may withdraw his or her consent to a State-administered blood test at any time before the blood sample has been analyzed, in this case eleven days thereafter. We disagree and reverse. In reviewing a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court. Where the evidence is uncontroverted and there is no question concerning the credibility of witnesses, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of law to the undisputed facts. State v. Stearns , 240 Ga. App. 806, 807 524 SE2d 554 1999; Joiner v. State , 239 Ga. App. 843, 848 2 522 SE2d 25 1999. “This Court must construe the evidence most favorably to upholding the trial court’s judgment in this regard. Cits.” State v. Burke , 230 Ga. App. 392, 393 496 SE2d 755 1998.
The question of whether one should be permitted to withdraw his or her consent to State-administered chemical testing after being arrested for DUI appears to be one of first impression. While we are mindful that our implied consent law allows a reasonable opportunity to rescind a refusal of a State-administered chemical test,1 see generally, McCafferty v. State , supra; Dep’t of Public Safety v. Seay , 206 Ga. App. 71, 73 1 424 SE2d 301 1992, we find no basis in such law to permit the withdrawal of consent to State testing once consent has been given and is an accomplished fact. In construing a statute, the determining factor is the intent of the legislature and we look first to the words of the statute to determine what that intent was and if those words be plain and unambiguous and the intent may be clearly gathered therefrom, we need look no further in determining what that intent was. Citation and punctuation omitted. Early v. Early , 269 Ga. 415, 416 499 SE2d 329 1998. Moreover, “where the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden.” Citation omitted. City of Jesup v. Bennett , 226 Ga. 606, 609 2 2 176 SE2d 81 1970. “In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words . . . .” OCGA § 1-3-1 b. There is no reason to depart from these rules in this case.
