Stephen Pearson was found guilty of malice murder and an alternative count of felony murder, as well as separate charges of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Because the verdict as to felony murder was vacated by operation of law Malcolm v. State , 263 Ga. 369, 372 4 434 SE2d 479 1993, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for malice murder and the remaining offenses. For the murder, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment and, for each of the other crimes, a consecutive five-year term. Pursuant to the grant of a motion for an out-of-time appeal, Pearson appeals those judgments of convictions and sentences.1 1. According to the State’s evidence, a verbal altercation began in a restaurant at which Richard Aaron and his brother were patrons. Pearson started the dispute, claiming to take offense at the way in which Aaron looked at him. The brothers left, but then returned. Although Aaron attempted to shake hands, Pearson did not reciprocate. Pearson then followed the two brothers into the parking lot. There, Pearson began yelling, and he fired several shots. Aaron was fatally wounded, and Pearson fled. The victim was not armed, but he was carrying a black bag. In his custodial statements, Pearson claimed that he acted in self-defense, believing that Aaron was reaching into the bag to retrieve a weapon. The evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Pearson was guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979.
With regard to the guilty verdict for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Pearson contends that the evidence is insufficient, because the State tendered only a non-certified copy of an indictment charging him with a felony violation of the Controlled Substances Act. However, a review of the face of the document shows the entry by Pearson of a guilty plea to the offense, to which plea he and his attorney both affixed their signatures. Although the indictment including the acknowledged guilty plea, as admitted, does not bear any certification, the record indicates that it was originally tendered as part of an exhibit identified as a certified copy of Pearson’s felony conviction. Defense counsel acknowledged that the exhibit was a certified copy of her client’s conviction, but objected because it contained the sentencing sheet as well as the indictment. Defense counsel stated that the “sentencing sheet is inappropriate to go back with the jury. Only the conviction itself should go out with the jury.” In response to this objection, the trial court admitted the indictment without the sentencing sheet. Apparently, the certification for the exhibit was contained on the sentencing sheet omitted pursuant to Pearson’s objection. Under these circumstances, he is precluded from asserting that the documentary proof of his prior conviction was uncertified. A party cannot solicit an evidentiary ruling and then complain of it on appeal. Ballard v. State , 232 Ga. App. 397 2 501 SE2d 889 1998. When construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Pearson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Jackson v. Virginia , supra; Glass v. State , 181 Ga. App. 448 1 352 SE2d 642 1987. Compare Brantley v. State , 272 Ga. 892 536 SE2d 509 2000.
