On September 1, 2001, plaintiff-appellee-judgment debtor Johnston County Airport Authority the “Airport” filed its verified complaint against defendant-appellant-judgment debtors J & M Aircraft and Mobile T- Hangar, Inc. collectively “J & M-Hangar” in the Superior Court of Johnston County, North Carolina, averring J & M-Hangar’s failure to pay it commissions and interest totaling $37,000, such commissions as earned upon the resale of aircraft hangars which J & M-Hangar built for the Airport. On February 14, 2002, the Airport filed an authenticated copy of the North Carolina judgment in the State Court of Carroll County “state court” under OCGA § 9-12-130 et seq., the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law. Thereafter served with post-judgment discovery, J & M-Hangar filed a motion for a protective order in the state court challenging the validity of service of process in North Carolina and the North Carolina judgment as not properly domesticated in Georgia. Such motion was denied, J & M-Hangar, joined by the companies’ principal and former officer, defendant-appellant-judgment debtors Deryl and Judy Perry, through initial counsel, entered into a consent order filed on April 29, 2003. Thereunder, the state court stayed the enforcement of the North Carolina default judgment pending the outcome of J & M-Hangar’s action to open the default in North Carolina, and, in the event of an unfavorable result, the Perrys and J & M-Hangar agreed to joint and several liability under the default judgment and to satisfy such liability not later than ten days after the “lifting of the stay.” On July 11, 2003, the North Carolina trial court refused to open the default, “ordering any and all stays of the Georgia action . . . terminated and vacated.” In state court, the Airport timely moved for issuance of a writ of fieri facias and sanctions upon the consent order entered by the parties in September 2003. On January 7, 2004, J &M-Hangar, pro se , under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 b1 sought removal of the underlying action from the state court to the Tribal Court of the State of Northern District “Tribal Court” of the Georgia Tribe of Eastern Cherokee, asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 5, 2004, following a January 21 hearing, the state court denied the Perrys’ notice of removal, domesticated the underlying judgment, and ordered the enforcement of the April 2003 consent order. Through new counsel on appeal,2 the Perrys for the first time contend that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Airport’s action against them to enforce a foreign judgment as civil litigation involving Cherokee Indians living on tribal land. Alternatively, in the event this Court should find jurisdiction in the state court, the Perrys contend that the state court erred by enforcing the consent order of the parties before “the appeal of the North Carolina action was complete.” The evidence of record shows that the Perrys are non-reservation Indians; that the dispute at issue did not arise in Cherokee Indian country; and that the consent order of the parties was properly consistent with public policy enforced upon its express terms. Accordingly, we disagree and affirm.
1. While the Perrys erred in grounding their notice of removal upon 28 U.S.C 1441 authorizing removal to districts courts only, id., under the Civil Practice Act “we judge a pleadings sic by its contents, not by its name.” Citations and punctuation omitted. Herringdine v. Nalley Equip. Leasing , 238 Ga. App. 210, 211 1 517 SE2d 571 1999. Thus, we address the validity of the Perrys’ claim that, as Cherokee Indians living on “traditional tribal territory” in Carroll County, they are entitled to remove the underlying action to the Tribal Court of the Georgia Tribe of the Eastern Cherokee, subject matter jurisdiction as in that court alone. See OCGA § 44-12-300 a 1 “The State of Georgia officially recognizes as legitimate American Indian tribes of Georgia . . . The Georgia Tribe of the Eastern Cherokee.”
