In January of 2000, Frank Wolcott pled guilty to charges of terroristic threats and criminal trespass set forth in one indictment, and to a count of burglary alleged in another. For each of the three crimes, he received first offender treatment and a probated sentence. Later that same year, the State initiated probation revocation proceedings against him as to both cases. Acting pro se, Wolcott entered into consent orders, whereby he admitted his alleged violation, and agreed to a four-month revocation of his probation to be followed by another probationary period. In September of 2003, the State again filed revocation petitions as to the two cases, alleging Wolcott’s recent commission of the offense of aggravated assault in DeKalb County. At the conclusion of the final revocation hearing, the trial court revoked probation in both of the underlying criminal cases. Wolcott sought permission to file a discretionary appeal. We granted the application because, among the other issues raised, there was a challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 42-8-29. 1. The probation revocation petitions were filed by Valerie Clark, in her capacity as Wolcott’s probation supervisor. Although Ms. Clark is not a licensed attorney, she was exercising the authority conferred on her by OCGA § 42-8-29. Under that statute, she acted as a State agent in the preparation and filing of the petitions for revocation of his probation. . . . In acting as an agent for the State of Georgia assigned to handle matters relating to Wolcott’s probation, Ms. Clark was a “party” to the action, as contemplated under OCGA § 15-19-52. As such, her filing of the petitions seeking a court hearing on the revocation of Wolcott’s probation does not entail the unauthorized practice of law, such as when a layman represents another, unrelated “person” in a legal capacity. Cit. Thus, . . . Ms. Clark was authorized to act on behalf of the State of Georgia in filling out the revocation petitions. Leverette v. State , 248 Ga. App. 304, 305 1 546 SE2d 63 2001.
The statutory grant to probation supervisors of the authority to file revocation petitions does not conflict with Eckles v. Atlanta Technology Group , 267 Ga. 801, 806 485 SE2d 22 1997, since we expressly recognized that our holding in that case was limited to “a layman’s legal representation in a court of record of another ‘person’ in the form of a separate corporate entity . . . .” Thus, “the reasoning behind the holding in Eckles does not impact on a State agent’s authority to petition the court on behalf of the State with regard to a matter within the scope of his or her employment.” Leverette v. State , supra at 306 1. Ms. Clark “is an officer of the court. Cit. As an officer of the court, a probation supervisor’s primary duty is to represent the interest of justice, not the interests of his or her employer.” Huzzie v. State , 253 Ga. App. 225, 226 558 SE2d 767 2002.
