William Shelton, Jr. brought suit against Linda Walden alleging slander per se, damage to his personal reputation, damage to his business reputation, wounded feeling and embarrassment, punitive damages, and attorney fees for allegedly false statements Walden made before the City Council of Temple, Georgia. Before the City Council, Walden accused Shelton of criminal conduct toward Walden and others and accused Shelton of owing money to the City of Temple for outstanding bond forfeitures, which resulted in the revocation of Shelton’s privilege to write bail bonds for the City of Temple. Shelton alleged that Walden’s actions were the result of ill will and malice toward him resulting from West Georgia Development Company, a company that Shelton is a partner in, obtaining approval from the City of Temple for a development that Walden and her husband opposed. Shelton’s initial complaint was not verified as required by Georgia’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation Statute codified at OCGA § 9-11-11.1 and referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute.1 However, in compliance with the statute, Shelton filed an amended complaint, which included a verification, within 10 days of notification of such defect by Walden. Subsequent to filing a timely answer, Walden made a motion to dismiss Shelton’s complaint, alleging that she was immune from suit under the anti-SLAPP statute for her statements to the City Council of Temple and that Shelton’s verification was insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. Prior to the trial court’s ruling, Shelton dismissed his complaint without prejudice on January 15, 2004.
On February 19, 2004, Walden filed a motion requesting attorney fees under OCGA § § 9-11-11.1 b and f and 9-15-14. On March 24, 2004, without a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Walden’s motion for attorney fees, finding that Shelton had not proceeded in bad faith and that he had presented a justiciable issue of law and fact to the court. The trial court further found that Shelton’s complaint required the trial court to make a determination of whether Walden’s statements reasonably fell within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute and whether they could be reasonably construed as an act of petitioning the government for redress of grievances in connection with an issue of public interest or concern. The trial court found Shelton’s claims “substantially justified” and that Walden’s request for attorney fees under OCGA § § 9-11-11.1 b and f and 9-15-14 was, therefore, “inapposite.” Walden appeals from this order, and in her sole enumeration of error, alleges that because the record lacked credible justification for Shelton’s complaint, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to assess sanctions under 9-11-11.1.
