A Lamar County jury convicted defendant Reece Brock of one count of aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. Crediting him with time served, the superior court sentenced Brock concurrently to serve 45 years confinement. Brock appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, contending that the superior court erred in finding that he had been afforded his constitutional right to testify; erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s failure to advise him of his right to testify; erred in finding the State’s evidence sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt as to Count One of the indictment, aggravated child molestation upon child victim R. W. B., for evidence that the applicable statute of limitation had not run; erred in admitting the child hearsay statements of R. W. B.’s younger sister, child victim J. L. B.; erred in denying him his right to cross-examine J. L. B.; erred in commenting on J. L. B.’s testimony as truthful; erred in allowing in evidence of child hearsay statements made by R. W. B. for no hearing on the indicia of reliability of these statements as child hearsay; and erred in finding that he had received effective assistance of counsel notwithstanding trial counsel’s failure to object to R. W. B.’s hearsay statements. Brock’s claims of error as without merit, we affirm. 1. Brock correctly contends that the superior court did not conduct an inquiry at trial to determine whether he wished to testify. However, this it was not required to do, Mobley v. State , 264 Ga. 854, 856 452 SE2d 500 1995, the primary responsibility for the advisement of such fundamental constitutional right1 is with trial counsel. Id. In this regard, at the motion for new trial hearing conceding that he had not advised Brock of his right to testify at trial, trial counsel testified that he had done so as a matter of standard operating procedure upon initially interviewing him. This Brock denied, although, through trial counsel, he had submitted his Request to Charge No. 6, “Defendant’s Failure to Testify”; he was present during the superior court’s preliminary charge to the jury wherein jurors were advised of his right to testify or remain silent; and he did not ask counsel to testify when the superior court asked if there were anything further at the close of his case. Under these circumstances, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Brock had been duly advised of his right to testify. “The trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial will be upheld on appeal unless it was an abuse of discretion.” Rowland v. State , 228 Ga. App. 66, 68 2 491 SE2d 119 1997. “It is the function of the trial court at a hearing on motion for new trial to determine witness credibility and to resolve any conflicts in the testimony. Cit.” Mobley v. State , supra.
2. Inasmuch as we have held that the superior court did not err in finding that Brock had been advised of his constitutional right to testify in his own defense, Brock’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel for the failure to advise him of such right does not lie for no showing of deficient performance as counsel. To show the denial of effective assistance of counsel, Brock was required to establish the deficient performance of trial counsel and that the deficiency inured to his detriment at trial. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 1984; Smith v. Francis , 253 Ga. 782, 783 325 SE2d 362 1985.
