The appellant in this action adds yet another chapter to the seemingly endless saga of his pro se journey through the courts. As we observed on the most recent occasion, over the last seven years, Reverend Kenneth Holmes has embroiled the courts in his dissatisfaction with his and his congregation’s expulsion from the United Baptist Church and with their resulting inability to use for worship services property of the UBC subsequently transferred to Achor Center, Inc. —a homeless shelter. To date, at least one unpublished and eight published appellate opinions have resulted. Capitol View Community Church v. Achor Center , 257 Ga. App. 423 571 SE2d 181 2002.1 In this eleventh opinion, we address a renewed appeal in Holmes’s malicious prosecution action against Achor, as previously set out in Achor III , supra, 249 Ga. App. 184. In that decision, Holmes appealed the grant of summary judgment to Achor on four separate counts of malicious prosecution. We affirmed with respect to his June 14, 1994 arrest for criminal trespass but reversed with respect to his June 11, 1993 arrest for simple assault and his June 30, 1994 arrests for aggravated stalking and criminal trespass. Id. at 185. After remittitur, Achor filed a renewed motion for summary judgment with respect to the June 30 arrests, and the trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed. 1. In Achor III , we noted that Achor had failed to show that the officer who arrested Holmes for criminal trespass on June 30 did so on the basis of his own observations rather than at the urging of an Achor employee. Achor III , supra, 249 Ga. App. at 193 2 d. In its renewed motion for summary judgment, Achor submitted the affidavit of the arresting officer stating that he personally observed Holmes at a location within 50 yards of the perimeter of Achor’s property. The officer testified that he was provided with a copy of a June 24, 1994 restraining order directing that Holmes keep “at least fifty 50 yards away from the perimeter of the property owned by Achor.” He further testified that he made an independent decision to arrest Holmes for criminal trespass “based upon my experience, conversation with Holmes, and observations of the situation. No person associated with Achor at any time urged me to arrest Holmes and charge him with these particular offenses.” The law draws a fine line of demarcation between cases where a party directly or indirectly urges a law enforcement official to begin criminal proceedings and cases where a party merely relays facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest or prosecute. The initiation of the criminal action need not be expressly directed by the party to be held liable. Citations and punctuation omitted. McLeod v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. , 215 Ga. App. 177, 179 1 449 SE2d 895 1994. Achor’s only involvement in the police officer’s investigation occurred when its security guard provided a copy of the restraining order. The police officer’s testimony “affirmatively shows the absence of any causal link between those acts attributable to defendants and the decision to arrest plaintiff,” and relieves Achor of liability for malicious prosecution. Id. at 179-180. The trial court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment on this count.
2. We next consider the June 30 arrest for aggravated stalking. As we noted in Achor III , the evidence is in conflict regarding the statement of a former employee that Holmes threatened her. Achor III , supra, 249 Ga. App. at 192 2 c. But Achor successfully contended below that our decision in Remeneski v. Klinakis , 222 Ga. App. 12, 16 473 SE2d 223 1996, renders this conflict immaterial. We agree and affirm.
