Hugh D. Adcock, Jr. died on April 14, 2001. Thereafter, appellee-defendant Gregory Dodd Adcock, individually; as temporary administrator of Hugh D. Adcock, Jr.; as heir of Hugh D. Adcock, Jr.; and as sole beneficiary under the will of Hugh D. Adcock, Jr. and sole heir, offered a petition to probate his father’s will in the Probate Court of Bartow County. Mr. Adcock’s second wife, appellant-plaintiff Geraldine R. Adcock, filed a caveat to the will, asserting a spouse’s interest in the estate. The probate judge granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss the caveat, concluding that the settlement agreement reached by the Adcocks following their separation constituted a renunciation of inheritance rights. Subsequently, Mrs. Adcock filed the instant declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of Bartow County, under OCGA § 19-6-12, seeking a declaration of her spousal rights in the marital residence she had lived in with Mr. Adcock. Mrs. Adcock now appeals from the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to the appellee in such action, contending that the superior court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that a deed made under a separation agreement remains enforceable after she reconciled and voluntarily cohabited with Mr. Adcock before his death. Likewise finding that the Adcocks’ reconciliation did not vitiate the separation agreement as to the division of property in issue under OCGA § 19-6-12, we affirm.
Pertinently, the record shows that the Adcocks separated on October 13, 2000, having lived together as man and wife for nearly nine years. On October 16, 2000, Mr. Adcock filed a petition for divorce in the Superior Court of Bartow County, and the couple thereafter entered into a separation agreement which, among other things, divided the debts of the parties; divided their property, real and personal; and provided that no alimony was to be awarded to either party. The agreement further specified that it was a full and final settlement of any and all claims either party might have against the other arising out of the marital contract and renounced any benefits provided by the will of either party unless executed after the date of the separation agreement. Pursuant to the separation agreement, executed on October 27, 2001, Mrs. Adcock thereafter removed her personal property from the marital residence and by quitclaim deed transferred her one-half interest therein to Mr. Adcock, In September 2001, Mrs. Adcock had received a cash payment from Mr. Adcock in the amount of $150,000.00 related to the residence. The validity of the transfer of property under OCGA § 19-6-12 is here in issue.
