Following the termination of his clinical privileges at St. Francis Hospital, Dr. Robert M. Patton sued Dr. Fred M. Burdette and the hospital, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by Burdette and the hospital after concluding that both were immune from Patton’s claims under the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 USC § 11101 et seq. the “Act”, and under Georgia’s peer review and medical review statutes, OCGA § § 31-7-130 et seq.; 31-7-140 et seq. Patton appeals this ruling,1 contending the trial court failed to apply the correct summary judgment standard and erred in concluding Burdette and the hospital were entitled to immunity from his claims. Finding no error, we affirm. The facts were set out in Patton v. St. Francis Hosp. , 246 Ga. App. at 4-5, as follows: Patton is a board-certified cardiologist, a sole practitioner, and was a member of the medical staff of St. Francis Hospital from 1975 to 1995. On December 19, 1995, the board of trustees of the hospital formally terminated Patton’s clinical privileges. Termination was made at the recommendation of the Medical Staff Executive Committee “MSEC”, which is responsible under medical staff bylaws for conducting peer reviews of its staff. The recommendation by the MSEC was preceded by a yearlong peer review process. The review was initially requested, following the death of one of Patton’s patients, by Dr. Fred M. Burdette, who is a board-certified cardiothoracic surgeon and was a member of the MSEC when he made the request. The peer review proceeding represented the fourth time the hospital had disciplined Patton because of patient care concerns. During the peer review process, several different committees convened, each of which gathered and reviewed information concerning the care and treatment given by Patton to the deceased patient. The stated purpose of this review was to evaluate and improve the quality of health care rendered at the hospital. Following a hearing during which Patton was represented by counsel and exercised his right to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence on his own behalf, the MSEC Ad Hoc Committee issued a report recommending that Patton merely be reprimanded for failing to timely order a specific test on the patient who died. The report stated that the care rendered by Patton was not inappropriate, but also stated that Patton “should have considered and ordered a specific test early on in her care.” The report questioned whether the test would have changed the outcome. Based on the conflicting language in the committee’s report, the MSEC requested reconsideration of the committee’s recommendation and added another physician to the committee. The committee then changed its recommendation and instead recommended that Patton’s privileges be terminated. Based on the new recommendation, the MSEC voted to recommend termination of Dr. Patton’s privileges. An appellate review committee appointed by the hospital board of trustees affirmed the decision of the MSEC, and the board of trustees made the final determination to terminate Patton’s privileges. In his complaint, Patton asserted claims for violations of the hospital by-laws, tortious interference with business relations, conspiracy, violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, breach of confidential relationship, defamation, and deprivation of the right to practice his profession. All of Patton’s claims arose from the actions taken by Burdette and the hospital during the year-long peer review process leading to the termination of his clinical privileges at the hospital. The trial court denied Patton’s motion to compel discovery of “copies of committee meeting minutes, committee reports, and information about who voted during what meetings, who was present at the meetings, and what was discussed during the various peer review meetings.” See Patton v. St. Francis Hosp. , 246 Ga. App. at 5. After we affirmed the discovery order, the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by Burdette and the hospital based on the immunity provided in the federal Act. See 42 USC § 11111 a. The court cited Georgia’s review statutes as an alternative basis for immunity. See OCGA § § 31-7-132 a; 31-7-141.
1. In three related enumerations of error, Patton contends the trial court erred in concluding Burdette and the hospital were entitled to immunity under the federal Act and Georgia’s review statutes. In particular, Patton contends Burdette and the hospital should not be allowed to avail themselves of both the immunity provisions of the federal Act and the privilege provisions of Georgia’s peer review and medical review statutes.2 See OCGA § § 31-7-133 peer review records confidential; 31-7-143 medical review committee proceedings and records immune from discovery or use as evidence in civil actions.
