Ehsan Razavi and Ingrid Trivino appeal the grant of summary judgment to Frank Shackelford in his action seeking the cancellation of real property liens filed by Razavi. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.1 So viewed, Razavi and Trivino filed 14 “affidavits for recording” against properties owned by Shackelford, alleging that Razavi and Shackelford entered an oral partnership agreement on June 28, 1998, to purchase, renovate, and sell real estate; that Shackelford’s role was to purchase the properties, while Razavi located them and supervised their renovation; and that Razavi was entitled to 50 percent of the profits earned by Shackelford on the properties. Trivino, who is Razavi’s girlfriend, also averred that she was a licensed real estate agent and that she assisted Razavi. Shackelford filed a petition to cancel and remove the liens created by the affidavits. Razavi and Trivino answered and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful dissolution, breach of implied promise to pay for services, quantum meruit, fraud, conversion, reformation, partition, constructive trust, and stubborn litigiousness. Shackelford moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no oral agreement, that the statute of frauds barred the alleged oral agreement, that the alleged oral agreement was too vague to enforce, and that the defendants admitted that they had no claim to the properties at issue. The trial court granted Shackelford’s motion, finding that the alleged oral agreement was too vague to be enforced, and that there was not sufficient evidence in the record to support Razavi’s counterclaim for quantum meruit. We affirm the ruling on the oral agreement but find the evidence on the quantum meruit claim sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
1. Razavi first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the agreement was too vague to enforce. The first requirement of the law relative to contracts is that there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and mutuality, and in order for the contract to be valid the agreement must ordinarily be expressed plainly and explicitly enough to show what the parties agreed upon. A contract cannot be enforced in any form of action if its terms are incomplete or incomprehensible.2 Razavi deposed that he and Shackelford did not discuss the duration of the agreement, the time each renovation should take, the length of time a property would be held until it was resold, how the houses would be selected, or how the properties would be held after their purchase. There was no agreement reached as to how Razavi would be compensated if Shackelford lost money on a house or how they would offset profits and losses. Razavi admitted that he and Shackelford only discussed one property on June 28. Other properties and their circumstances were discussed at a later date. As there was no meeting of the minds on essential terms, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the oral agreement was not enforceable.3
