This is the fifth appeal docketed in this Court1 precipitated by the following events: In 1995, the Glynn-Brunswick Memorial Hospital Authority Authority, which operated Southeast Georgia Regional Medical Center in Brunswick, Georgia, became concerned about problems with the anesthesiology services provided by the hospital’s anesthesiology department. At that time the anesthesiology department was comprised of nine independent anesthesiologists each holding privileges to practice at the hospital. The Authority decided that anesthesiology coverage at the hospital could best be provided by an organized group of anesthesiologists, and notified the anesthesiology department of its decision. Six of the anesthesiologists formed Alta Anesthesia Associates of Georgia, P. C. and procured a contract, which became effective around July of 1996, to provide anesthesiology services to the hospital. At the Authority’s insistence, the contract expressly allowed the three doctors who did not join Alta to continue to provide anesthesiology services at the hospital and expressly provided that they would be incorporated into the anesthesiology schedule “as requested by surgeons and others.” However, new anesthesiologists would have to join Alta before they could practice at the hospital. One of the three doctors who did not join Alta was Dr. Carol Mulligan, who had held privileges to provide anesthesiology services at the hospital since 1991. On September 29, 1999 Mulligan and her professional corporation Carol Mulligan, M.D., P.C. referred to collectively as Mulligan filed a multi-count complaint against Alta, the Authority, and Lynne Imhoff, M.D., asserting claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade, tortious interference with business relations, breach of duty to follow existing by-laws, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted Alta and Imhoff summary judgment, and Mulligan filed this appeal challenging the grant of summary judgment on her conspiracy to restrain trade and tortious interference claims. 1. On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. “A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. , 226 Ga. App. 459 1 486 SE2d 684 1997.
Mulligan argues, in essence, that summary judgment was improperly granted in her case because her claims and the evidence supporting her claims are similar or identical to those asserted by another independent anesthesiologist, Dr. Jacquelyn Gibbons, in Alta Anesthesia Assocs. of Georgia v. Gibbons , 245 Ga. App. 79 537 SE2d 388 2001, in which this Court upheld a jury award for the plaintiff.2 Mulligan also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to find that her conspiracy to restrain trade claim is a separate and cognizable claim apart from her tortious interference claim. We agree with Mulligan that summary judgment was improperly granted, but disagree that a separate cause of action for restraint of trade exists under the facts of this case. In both Gibbons and the case at hand, plaintiffs asserted that after Alta was awarded the contract to provide anesthesiology services to the hospital, it manipulated the operating room schedule and first call assignments3 so that the independent anesthesiologists were assigned fewer cases or were assigned fewer of the higher paying cases, and further that through intimidation and the refusal to assist the independent anesthesiologists, it sought to have the doctors and the staff at the hospital use and prefer the services of Alta and its members over those of the independent anesthesiologists. Id. at 81. And in both Gibbons and the case at hand, the plaintiffs asserted that these actions constituted, inter alia, a conspiracy to restrain trade. Id. at 82. On appeal in Gibbons , Alta asserted that it was entitled to a directed verdict “because Georgia law does not recognize a tort for restraint of trade.” Id. at 82 2. Without expressly addressing this issue, we upheld the denial of the motion for directed verdict, noting that the focus of our review is upon “substance and not merely nomenclature” and that a judgment which is right for any reason will be affirmed. Id. at 83 2. We then went on to find that the trial court had charged on what was “essentially the tort of interference with business relations,” Id. at 84 2, elaborating on the nature of the claim as follows:
