We granted the application of RCG Properties, LLC RCG for discretionary review after the trial court dismissed RCG’s appeal of a decision of the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment BZA without addressing the merits of that appeal. In dismissing RCG’s appeal, the trial court decided that RCG lacked standing to seek judicial review of the BZA’s decision. Because the trial court overlooked the controlling law and failed to apply the proper standard of review, we reverse and remand this case with direction. On January 19, 2001, Holder Properties, Inc. Holder submitted an application to the City of Atlanta Bureau of Planning bureau for a special administrative permit that would allow construction of “an eleven story precast concrete parking structure” at 221 Peachtree Center Avenue. This property lies within an area zoned as Special Public Interest-1 SPI-1 in the Central Core District of Atlanta. Holder understood that it could not build its proposed parking structure unless the bureau approved its application for the permit. On February 14, 2001, Alycen Whiddon, the assistant director of the bureau, granted Holder’s application for the permit and also granted a variation to Holder from SPI-1 district regulations. The variation authorized “a reduction of public space requirements to accommodate retail, from required 4570 sf to 3334 sf.”
RCG filed a timely appeal of the bureau’s administrative action with the BZA. When considering an appeal of a decision made by the bureau, the BZA is required to find for the appealing party “upon an expressed finding by the board that the administrative official’s action was based on an erroneous finding of material fact, or that he acted in an arbitrary manner.” City Code § 16-30.010 d. In seeking review of the bureau’s action, RCG contended that Holder’s application did not comply with certain mandatory criteria for obtaining a permit and asserted that the bureau failed to consider all of the applicable standards. RCG claimed “the approval of the SAP and the variation were based on an erroneous finding of material fact and constituted an arbitrary act” in that the bureau “failed to follow the requirements in Sections 16-25.002 3 and 16.18.007 of the Zoning Ordinance.”
