The appellant, Harold Vaughn, appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the appellee, Sharon Stoenner, on Vaughn’s claims regarding title to a certain tract of land in Jackson County, Georgia. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Stoenner on Vaughn’s claim for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement that Stoenner would give him her interest in the land if he paid off the mortgage on which both of them were obligated. We also conclude, however, that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Stoenner on Vaughn’s claim for title by adverse possession. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse it in part. In July 1971, Vaughn and Stoenner, who were dating, bought 76.01 acres of land together in Jackson County. The property was conveyed to them by warranty deed, and both Vaughn and Stoenner signed a promissory note and security deed on the property. The parties separated sometime between 1973 and 1975, and had no communication until shortly before Vaughn filed this action in March 2001. In his complaint, Vaughn alleged that at the time of separation, he and Stoenner entered into an oral agreement that if he paid for the property she would give him her interest in it; that he had paid the mortgage on the property, as well as the taxes on the property; and that he had made valuable improvements to the property. Vaughn sought sole title to the property by seeking specific performance of the alleged oral agreement. He also alleged that he had obtained sole title by adverse possession. The trial court, however, granted summary judgment to Stoenner on Vaughn’s claims for title to the property.
1. Vaughn contends that the trial court erred in finding that in November 2000 he made a judicial admission in a settlement agreement in an unrelated divorce case that estopped him from contending that he is the sole owner of the property. The trial court found that Vaughn’s statement constituted an admission that Vaughn was only a one-half owner of the property in question. We disagree with the trial court’s reading of the settlement agreement. Our review shows that Vaughn simply acknowledged that the record title showed that he and Stoenner were one-half owners of the property and that a dispute, which probably would be resolved by litigation, existed with Stoenner over Vaughn’s ownership interest in the property. The agreement even stated that Vaughn’s wife agreed to “cooperate and assist Vaughn in establishing that he paid for, maintained and cultivated the . . . property without contribution from . . . Stoenner.” For these reasons, the settlement agreement did not constitute a judicial admission by Vaughn that his ownership interest in the property was limited to a one-half interest, and the trial court erred in ruling to the contrary. Moreover, even if the Vaughn’s statement in the settlement agreement could be determined to be a judicial admission that he owned only a one-half interest in the property, that admission was only binding in the divorce litigation with his wife and would not estop him from asserting a claim to more than a one-half interest in the property in the present case.1
