Stephanie Black was stabbed to death in her home. Police canvassed the neighborhood, attempting to locate witnesses. Appellant, Clarence Tye, lived next door to the victim, and was standing on his porch when an investigator approached to question him. The two were joined by a police photographer. At some point, Tye admitted that he had an intimate relationship with the victim. His shoes and the lower portion of his pants were stained with what he explained to be blood from an injury to his finger sustained while restraining a leashed dog. When asked to surrender the shoes, Tye agreed. Testing showed that the stains were blood from both Tye and Ms. Black. He was arrested and charged with murder. The defense moved to suppress the evidence of the victim’s blood. The trial court conducted a hearing, at the conclusion of which it expressed the intent to deny the motion, based on the fact that the shoes were in plain view, they were immediately apparent, the blood on the shoes from the photograph was immediately apparent and the officer was in a location where he was authorized to be. He was . . . on the defendant’s porch and not in his house. Also on the basis of the consent given by the defendant. No written order denying the motion was signed or filed. Almost two years later, however, the trial court entered a written order granting the motion. The order did not expressly address the plain view doctrine, and was based instead upon the trial court’s conclusion that the State failed to prove that Tye voluntarily consented to the surrender of his shoes. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, and that Court correctly transferred the case to us in accordance with State v. Thornton , 253 Ga. 524 1 322 SE2d 711 1984.
1. When relying on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances. Raulerson v. State , 268 Ga. 623, 625 2 a 491 SE2d 791 1997. Application of the totality of the circumstances test requires consideration of several factors, including the age of the accused, his education, his intelligence, the length of detention, whether the accused was advised of his constitutional rights, the prolonged nature of questioning, the use of physical punishment, and the psychological impact of all these factors on the accused. In determining voluntariness, no single factor is controlling. Cit. Dean v. State , 250 Ga. 77, 80 2 a 295 SE2d 306 1982.
