We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a municipality may be held liable for injuries a suspect incurs when the suspect is fleeing police in a high speed chase. The Court of Appeals held that the municipality could be liable for the wrongful death of the suspect upon a showing that the police officer acted in reckless disregard of proper police procedures.1 Because the wrongful death claim was brought by the parents of the fleeing suspect and the reckless disregard standard of OCGA § 40-6-6 d 2 applies only to the claim of an innocent party, we reverse. Fourteen-year-old Ashley McDougald took her father’s car without permission and was driving in the City of Winder at 4:40 a.m. without turning on the car’s headlights. A City police officer observed another vehicle flash its lights at McDougald and when McDougald failed to turn on the lights, the officer turned on his blue flashing lights and began to follow McDougald. When McDougald continued to drive without headlights, the officer turned on his siren and McDougald sped away. While the officer followed McDougald, she increased her speed and soon lost control of the car and hit a utility pole. McDougald was killed and her parents sued the officer and the City. The trial court denied summary judgment for the City, holding that the City had waived immunity to the extent of its insurance coverage and that it could be liable if the officer acted negligently.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the City’s motion, but held that the standard for liability under OCGA § 40-6-6 d 2 was whether the police officer acted in reckless disregard of proper police procedures.
Prior to 1995, OCGA § 40-6-6 a provided that an officer pursuing a suspect “shall not be relieved . . . from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.” In Mixon v. City of Warner Robbins ,3 this Court relied on this provision to hold that a municipality could be liable for injuries to an innocent third-party caused by a suspect who was fleeing police. A municipality’s civil liability “is solely dependent upon the officer’s own adherence to his duty to drive with the requisite due regard for the safety of others.”4 Summary judgment would be appropriate only if the evidence demanded a finding that the officer properly balanced the risk to the safety of other drivers in the pursuit against the interest in apprehending the suspect. Under this standard, the Court concluded that the trial court had erred in entering summary judgment for the defendants, and thus, the Court expanded the liability of police and municipalities.
