The State appeals from the trial court’s grant of Betty Sue Graddy’s Motion to Suppress the evidence seized from her residence, a shop, shed and trailer near her residence, and dismissal of the charges of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and manufacturing methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school for lack of probable cause. 1. When reviewing a trial court’s order on a motion to suppress, where some facts are contested and some are not, this Court views the contested facts under the clearly erroneous standard, while review of the application of law to the uncontested facts is de novo. Vansant v. State , 264 Ga. 319, 320 1 443 SE2d 474 1994; Swan v. State , 257 Ga. App. 704, 705 572 SE2d 64 2002.
We consider first the State’s fourth enumeration of error, that the trial court erred in finding no probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. In determining probable cause for a search warrant, the magistrate is merely to ‘make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ DeYoung v. State , 268 Ga. 780, 787 7 493 SE2d 157 1997, quoting State v. Stephens , 252 Ga. 181, 182 311 SE2d 823 1984. . . . Ultimately, this Court’s role on review is to ‘determine if the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.’ DeYoung at 787 7. See also Grier v. State , 266 Ga. 170, 172 2 b 465 SE2d 655 1996. Footnote omitted. Abraha v. State , 271Ga. 309, 311 1 518 SE2d 894 1999. See also State v. Towe , 246 Ga. App. 808-809 541 SE2d 423 2000.
