We granted appellant-defendant Tommy Hugh Giles’ application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the Superior Court of Baldwin County erred in denying his motion to set aside judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the law of the case rule, and the doctrine of res judicata upon our dismissal of the underlying dispossessory action. This case began as a dispossessory warrant in the Magistrate Court of Baldwin County. Dissatisfied with the judgment entered against him, appellee-plaintiff Michael D. Vastakis sought de novo review in the superior court. During the pendency of the appeal, Vastakis amended his appeal to add claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Over Giles’ objection, the superior court tried such additional claims, granting Vastakis declaratory and injunctive relief by its amended judgment.1 Thereafter, we dismissed Giles’ direct appeal from the amended judgment of the superior court for failure to comply with the discretionary appeal requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 a, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Subsequently, Giles filed the complained-of motion to set aside judgment in the superior court under OCGA § 9-11-60 d. On discretionary appeal from the denial of his motion to set aside judgment, Giles renews the claim that the amended judgment of the superior court should be set aside as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. And, pointing to our dismissal of the direct appeal, Giles further claims that the law of the case rule and the related doctrine of res judicata do not lie to require the denial of his motion. These claims as meritorious, we reverse.
Appeals de novo to the state or superior court of the county lie from judgments returned from the county magistrate court. OCGA § 15-10-41 b 1. Such an appeal “brings up the whole record from the lower court below; and all competent evidence shall be admissible on the trial thereof, whether adduced on a former trial or not. Either party is entitled to be heard on the whole merits of the case.” OCGA § 5-3-29. “All competent evidence must be admitted on de novo appeal to superior court regardless of whether it concerned new issues.” Barmore v. Himebaugh , 200 Ga. App. 868 410 SE2d 46 1991, citing Lee v. Wainwright , 256 Ga. 478, 479 350 SE2d 238 1986. “However, the state and superior courts, on de novo appeals, have only the jurisdiction possessed by the magistrate court.” Jr. Mills Constr. v. Trichinotis , 223 Ga. App. 19, 21 477 SE2d 141 1996; Goodman v. Little, 213 Ga. 178, 179 97 SE2d 567 1957; Knowles v. Knowles , 125 Ga. App. 642, 645 1 188 SE2d 800 1972. Moreover, Giles correctly contends that magistrate court jurisdiction is not inclusive of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief authority, the same as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts. OCGA § 9-4-2; Constitution of Georgia 1983, Article VI, Section 1, Paragraph IV. Pertinently, a magistrate court has jurisdiction over “civil claims including garnishment and attachment in which exclusive jurisdiction is not vested in the superior court.” Emphasis supplied. OCGA § 15-10-2 5.
