Joyce Jean Coker appeals from the Superior Court of Bibb County’s order denying a motion to withdrawn her guilty plea entered upon a reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter.1 Coker claims that she was not competent at the time of the entry of the plea and that, consequently, the plea was not entered freely and voluntarily; she also claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, because her attorney failed to request that Coker undergo a psychiatric evaluation for purposes of an insanity defense. Finding both of these claims to be without merit, we affirm. 1. Once sentence is pronounced, as occurred in this case, a withdrawal of a plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court; this discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse thereof. With regard to the validity of a guilty plea, the burden is on the State to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. The State may accomplish this end by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights she was waiving and the possible consequences of her plea.2 “The trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence.”3
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the State introduced the transcript of the guilty plea. On its face, the transcript shows that Coker’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered after Coker was advised and claimed an understanding of all rights waived by virtue of the entry of a plea; Coker stated that her attorney had “explained everything to me”; Coker stated that she understood the consequence of her plea; Coker specifically stated that she understood the plea process and that nothing kept her from thinking clearly and that she was thinking clearly during the entry of the plea; and Coker’s attorney stated that she had explained to Coker her legal and constitutional rights and knew of no reason why the trial court should not accept Coker’s guilty plea. In addition, the plea transcript contains a sufficient factual basis for the entry of a plea to voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the State carried its burden of showing that the plea was constitutionally sound.