Stephanie Pabey, a/k/a Myong Chin Lee, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for summary judgment as to claims asserted against her by the state in a civil forfeiture action under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq. In connection with that action, the state seized certain of Pabey’s assets, which were alleged to have been used to violate the RICO statute in connection with VIP Massage, the massage parlor she ran in Camden County. Under OCGA § 16-14-7 b, civil forfeiture proceedings are governed by the Georgia Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq., “except to the extent that special rules of procedure are stated in this chapter.” Because no special rules exist within the RICO chapter regarding motions for summary judgment, OCGA § 9-11-56 governs Pabey’s motion. To succeed on her motion under that statute, therefore, Pabey must point to an absence of evidence to support the state’s case, at which point the burden shifts to the state to point to specific evidence in support of its claims: A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue. Cit. Tronitec, Inc. v. Shealy , 249 Ga. App. 442, 444-445 1 c 547 SE2d 749 2001.
The RICO statute provides that “it is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including money.” OCGA § 16-14-4 a Under the act, “pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in “at least two acts of racketeering activity . . . that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents. . . .” OCGA § 16-14-3 8; see also Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 417-418 349 SE2d 717 1986. “Racketeering activity” is defined to mean the commission of a crime in any of a number of specified categories of offenses, known as predicate acts. OCGA § 16-14-3 9 A.
