Donald Reese claims the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against his suit bringing false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims against the City of Atlanta and its police officer employee, E. B. Lane, and claims against the City for negligent hiring and retention of officer Lane.1 Because we find the City was entitled to governmental immunity and officer Lane was entitled to official immunity, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. While officer Lane was investigating a report that Reese had been scalping tickets outside the Georgia Dome, Reese reacted in a loud and agitated manner toward the officer, refused the officer’s command that he leave the premises, and walked away from the officer toward another part of the premises while continuing to loudly protest the investigation. Because Reese refused to leave, the officer arrested him for criminal trespass. The charges were later dismissed because officer Lane failed to appear in Court. The negligent hiring and retention claims were based on allegations that the City knew or should have known Lane was not a competent officer.
Under the doctrine of official immunity, officer Lane was provided limited protection from being sued in his personal capacity for negligent acts taken within the scope of his official authority as a City police officer. Cameron v. Lang , 274 Ga. 122-125 549 SE2d 341 2001; Gilbert v. Richardson , 264 Ga. 744, 750 452 SE2d 476 1994. The doctrine provides that, while public agents or employees may be personally liable for negligent ministerial acts taken within the scope of their official authority, they are immune from personal liability for discretionary acts taken within that authority, unless such acts are performed with malice or an intent to injure. Gilbert , 264 Ga. at 752; Cameron , 274 Ga. at 123. “The rationale for this immunity is to preserve the public employee’s independence of action without fear of lawsuits and to prevent a review of his or her judgment in hindsight.” Id. at 123.
