In this interlocutory appeal concerning a personal injury action under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20, the Georgia Department of Defense “GDOD” appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment, contending that the claims made by Mitchell B. Johnson, a federally employed civil technician and member of the Georgia National Guard at the time of the accident in question, are barred by the doctrine of intra-military immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we agree and reverse. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Citation omitted. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp .1 Viewed in this light, the record shows that Johnson, as a federally employed civil technician and a member of the Georgia National Guard, worked in the sheet metal shop at Dobbins Air Force Base, a federally run facility of the U. S. Air Force. While repairing a helicopter, Johnson was struck in the eye by a piece of a riveter he was using, resulting in his partial blindness. Johnson subsequently filed suit against the GDOD pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20, contending that the State Adjutant General, the executive head of the GDOD, failed to properly train him to use the riveter or to provide appropriate supervision during its use.2
The GDOD filed a motion for summary judgment, and, on October 23, 2002, the trial court denied the motion, finding, without explanation, that genuine issues of material fact remained. The GDOD now appeals this ruling, contending that Johnson’s claims are barred by the intra-military doctrine of Feres v. United States .3 In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that members of the armed services could not sue the government for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” Id at 146, quoted in United States v. Johnson .4 The Court grounded its ruling on the fact that relations between the government and its military personnel were “distinctively federal in character,” exclusively governed by federal law, and that a comprehensive, even-handed government compensation scheme was available for service-connected injuries. Id. at 143-45. Later Supreme Court decisions emphasized the effect that private lawsuits might have on military discipline. See, e.g., United States v. Shearer; 5 Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States. 6 Stauber v. Cline .7
