Eugene Lamar’s appeals originate from two state court misdemeanor traffic cases arising in October of 1999, which were consolidated for disposition in the court below.1 We consolidate them for purposes of this appeal, since they involve precisely the same issue on the same set of facts. The record shows that, shortly after his arrest in 1999, Lamar was released on bond on the instant traffic offenses. Thereafter, he was incarcerated on and off between 1999 and 2002 on unrelated offenses. Prior to August of 2002, he was paroled from an unrelated offense. In August of 2002, Lamar came into state court to dispose of the instant traffic offenses. In the course of such disposition, Lamar learned that the State sought a year’s incarceration on the charges. He then made a motion to dismiss based upon a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A very brief hearing was held on the motion wherein it was clear that Lamar’s allegations were meritless in that: 1 Lamar had bonded out on the traffic charges and was never incarcerated on them;2 2 an equal cause for delay in the disposition of the cases was due to Lamar’s failure to inform the court clerk or the bonding company of his change of address after, as Lamar put it, he “had a banishment” from his previous address;3 3 Lamar never requested disposition and/or trial on the instant traffic charges, even when he was incarcerated on unrelated offenses;4 and 4 Lamar’s sole asserted basis for being “cruelly prejudiced” by pretrial delay was not that his defense was in anyway impaired or that he suffered anxiety, but that his sentencing was effected, i.e., if he had known the State wanted a year’s prison time on the traffic charges, he could have had the incarceration run at the same time as his incarceration on unrelated offenses.5 The trial court denied the speedy trial motion. Lamar’s lawyer was ready: Your Honor, I have taken the liberty, if I may, using Judge McLaughlin’s rule to present orders before my notice of appeal would be effective, I need to have the order signed and docketed. If I might present —present the order. And since this order is directly appealable, Judge, once the order is signed and entered, I —I’ve prepared a notice of appeal and have got my check for the twenty-five dollars for each appeal, because that’s what they want, which I intend to file this morning, if it please the court. Where’s our clerk . . . And I think with that, this court loses jurisdiction of this matter. A hearing transcript was finally prepared on February 26, 2003. It was sent to this Court, and the instant appeal was docketed on March 3, 2003. Lamar has remained on bond on these traffic offenses for eight months, pending disposition of this appeal.
And, so, we see first-hand the “persuasive rationale for . . . creating a distinction between constitutional and statutory speedy trial rulings”6 when it comes to direct appeal. A statutory speedy trial claim contains procedural safeguards to prevent its use solely for purposes of delay, i.e., a demand for speedy trial must be filed within a specific time period well in advance of any trial date ; service of notice on the State must be accomplished; the defendant’s desire for trial is made abundantly clear; and the time period in which trial must be held is specified.7
