This appeal arises out of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed by James Matthew Harland. Harland entered a guilty plea to two counts of child molestation and two counts of terroristic threats. The State nolle prossed three counts of aggravated child molestation, three counts of aggravated sodomy, and one count of statutory rape. He was sentenced to 20 year terms on each child molestation conviction and to five years on each terroristic threats conviction, with the sentences running concurrently with each other. The sentence provided that upon serving ten years’ imprisonment on the child molestation convictions, he could serve the remainder on probation. Harland filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied by the trial court. Harland appeals, arguing that the plea “was entered unknowingly and unintelligently.” Harland argues that he was a “scared seventeen-year old,” and that he was informed “for the first time during the guilty plea hearing” of the rights he was waiving in exchange for his plea. He contends “that he did not have sufficient time to process this information so that he could enter a guilty plea voluntarily and knowingly.” Harland’s plea counsel did not testify during the hearing on Harland’s motion to withdraw his plea. Because the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Harland’s plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, we affirm. Before accepting a plea of guilty, a trial court must determine that the plea is voluntarily made and that the defendant intelligently and understandingly waives his constitutional rights, which requires a showing on the record that the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. When a defendant enters a plea of guilty and subsequently challenges the validity of the guilty plea, the State may meet its burden of demonstrating the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered by two means, 1 showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or 2 filling a silent or incomplete record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Citations and punctuation omitted. Stephens v. State , 235 Ga. App. 756, 757-758 510 SE2d 575 1998.
The State was not required in this case to use “extrinsic evidence” to show that Harland’s “plea was knowing and voluntary,” id., because the transcript of the guilty plea hearing itself shows that he understood the rights he was waiving and the consequences of entering a plea.
