USA Payday Cash Advance Centers, American Cash Advance, Inc., EZ Credit, Inc., Fast Cash ‘Til Payday, Inc., Great American Cash Advance, Inc., Great American Credit, Inc., Monday ‘Til Payday, Inc., USA Payday Advance, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center #8, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center #9, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center #10, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center #11, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center #12, Inc., USA Payday Cash Advance Center #13, Inc., and USA Payday Cash Advance Center #14, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action against John W. Oxedine, individually and in his official capacity as Industrial Loan Commissioner, in Fulton Superior Court to determine that the Industrial Loan Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over its business practices as service provider for and involved with County Bank of Rehobeth Beach, a Delaware state chartered bank, which is subject to regulation under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. However, the service provider contract with County Bank was never intoduced into evidence so that the merits of the declaratory judgment action could not be reached by the trial court even if there had been an exhaustion of administrative remedies by USA Payday Advance. Oxendine moved for summary judgment for plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust plaintiffs’ administrative remedies before the Industrial Loan Commissioner; the motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court for Oxendine. Finding no error, we affirm. In July of 2002, the Commissioner authorized an examination of the “payday loan” activities of USA Payday Advance Centers. As a result of the examination, an administrative “show cause” order issued, and the plaintiffs were among the parties named in the order. After the hearing on October 11, 2002, the Commissioner found that the plaintiffs were in violation of the Industrial Loan Act in making loans without an industrial loan license and in making false and deceptive advertisments of loans; the Commissioner commanded them to cease and desist from making loans “except as permitted under the Georgia Industrial Loan Act.” Plaintiffs were charging an annual interest rate of 650. On October 22, 2002, the superior court denied plaintiffs’ appeal of the order. On December 2, 2002, plaintiffs dismissed that appeal.
On December 3, 2003, plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action and alleged that they no longer made the loans but that, as “service providers” for County Bank, the loans were now made by County Bank through them. November 13, 2002, was the effective date for such new business procedure to begin. Plaintiffs claimed an exemption from the Georgia Industrial Loan Act as agents for the out-of-state bank. However, such provider agreement, that was alleged in the verified pleadings, was never put into evidence.
