Hughie Simmons appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss and plea in bar based on an alleged violation of OCGA § 16-1-7 b. Because Simmons failed to show that the proper prosecuting attorney had actual knowledge of all the charges against him, the trial court did not err in denying his motion. On March 27, 2001, Simmons was stopped for speeding and was arrested for the offense of driving as a habitual violator. Tickets for each charge were issued to him, notifying him to appear in recorder’s court on April 27, 2001. Simmons bonded out of jail but failed to appear for the scheduled court date. A rule nisi hearing was scheduled for June 22, 2001 with respect to the speeding citation. On that date, the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court issued a bond forfeiture order on the speeding ticket. The order recites that the forfeiture was “accepted in lieu of fines and shall be the final disposition of this case.” The habitual violator ticket is stamped “Warrant,” and it appears that no further action was taken in recorder’s court concerning that citation. In July 2002, Simmons was charged by accusation in superior court with one count of driving a motor vehicle as a habitual violator. He filed a motion to dismiss and plea in bar, arguing among other things that the State violated OCGA § 16-1-7 b. He appeals from the denial of that motion.
Under OCGA § 16-1-7 b, the State must prosecute a defendant for multiple crimes arising from the same conduct in a single prosecution if the crimes “are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.” Id. This code section applies “only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.” Citation and punctuation omitted. Baker v. State , 257 Ga. 567, 569 361 SE2d 808 1987. Simmons failed to show that anyprosecuting officer was present during the bond forfeiture proceeding in recorder’s court. In fact, he concedes in his appellate brief that “there are no prosecuting attorneys assigned to DeKalb County Recorder’s Court.” He argues, however, that “since there is no prosecuting attorney at the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court, in this case either the arresting officer or the presiding Judge at the Recorder’s Court proceedings should be deemed to be the proper prosecuting officer.”
