Darrell Mitchell was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, OCGA § 16-13-30. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, alleging that “the evidence was sufficiently close to warrant the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting a new trial even if guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Finding no merit in this contention, we affirm. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. We neither weigh the evidence nor determine witness credibility. As long as there is some evidence, even though contradicted, to support each element required to make the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be affirmed. Footnotes omitted. Jackson v. State , 246 Ga. App. 133 1 539 SE2d 849 2000. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence established the following. On May 9, 2002, an Atlanta police officer was conducting surveillance near the intersection of Parkway and North Avenue, an area of suspected drug activity. At around 9:30 p.m., Mitchell parked his car in a lot across the street from the officer, who testified that he had a clear view of Mitchell. Mitchell got out of his car and walked across the street toward an apartment complex. He concealed two brown paper bags in the shrubbery outside the building, and then moved to a nearby sidewalk. Over the next 30 minutes, the officer watched Mitchell engage in eight to ten transactions in which Mitchell took money from pedestrians and gave them objects from inside the bags. After each transaction, Mitchell would cross the street and put money in the glove compartment of his car. Once the officer had secured backup assistance, he detained Mitchell and retrieved the bags from the bushes. The bags contained 65 hits of crack cocaine, packaged separately in small plastic bags. The police also recovered $772, in denominations from $1 to $20, from Mitchell’s glove compartment.
Mitchell points to OCGA § 5-5-21 for the proposition that the trial court should have exercised its discretion to grant a new trial. That statute provides that “the presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.”
