Albert Paul Floyd, Jr. was found guilty by a jury of operating a motor vehicle after receiving notice that his license had been revoked as a habitual violator; driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol while transporting a child under the age of 14 years in the vehicle. On appeal, Floyd does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, but contends: 1 that the trial court improperly expressed an opinion about him; 2 that the State violated his Equal Protection Clause rights by striking African-American potential jurors from the jury panel on the basis of race, and 3 that his trial counsel was ineffective. We find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction. 1. We find nothing in the record to support Floyd’s contention that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 by improperly expressing an opinion to the jury that he was a criminal or was guilty of the charged offenses. In response to questions posed by the jury during deliberations, the trial court re-charged the jury that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the State has the burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In giving the re-charge, the trial court inadvertently stated that the rule is “true of all criminals who come into criminal court.” The trial court immediately corrected itself to the jury, stated that it used the wrong word, and said it meant “all defendants who come into criminal court.” There was no error.
2. Floyd claims the trial court erred by rejecting his claim under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79 106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69 1986 that the State violated his Equal Protection Clause rights by exercising its peremptory strikes during jury selection to intentionally exclude African-Americans from the jury on the basis of race.1 A Batson challenge initiates a three-step process requiring first that the party challenging the strikes establish a prima facie inference that the strikes were exercised with racially discriminatory intent. If a prima facie case of racial discrimination is established, under the second and third steps, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strikes to give race-neutral reasons for the strikes, and the trial court then considers the reasons given and decides whether the challenger has proven discriminatory intent. During this process, the burden of persuasion as to discriminatory intent does not shift from and remains with the challenger. Griffeth v. State , 224 Ga. App. 462, 463 480 SE2d 889 1997. The trial court determined that Floyd had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination and required that the State explain why it struck three African-American potential jurors. The prosecutor explained that he struck the first juror at issue because the juror knew Floyd; the second juror because the juror was unemployed, and the third juror because the juror was related to one defendant previously prosecuted by his office and was friends with or knew other defendants prosecuted by his office.
