William Thomas Perkins was charged in separate citations with felony vehicular homicide and reckless driving, both of which crimes arose out of the same automobile collision. Where a death is caused by reckless driving, the offense is felony vehicular homicide. OCGA § 40-6-393 a. Perkins pled guilty in probate court to reckless driving and was convicted of only that offense. Thereafter, the grand jury indicted Perkins for felony vehicular homicide and for the underlying reckless driving offense. He filed a plea in bar on the ground of former jeopardy, and the State moved to set aside the prior reckless driving conviction in probate court pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-376 d, which provides the following: No court, other than a court having jurisdiction to try a person charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393, shall have jurisdiction over any offense . . . which . . . arose out of the same conduct which led to said person’s being charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393 and any judgment rendered by such court shall be null and void. The trial court sustained the plea in bar, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Perkins’ reckless driving conviction was not null and void under this statute, because the probate court had jurisdiction to try misdemeanor vehicular homicide cases charged under subsection b of OCGA § 40-6-393. State v. Perkins , 256 Ga. App. 855, 856 1 SE2d 2002 two judges concurred specially. Two judges dissented, opining that, because the specific focus of the statute is on the charge against a specific person, it divests a probate court of jurisdiction over an underlying misdemeanor offense, such as reckless driving, when that person has been charged with felony vehicular homicide. State v. Perkins , supra at 857-859 Eldridge, J., dissenting. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in construing OCGA § 40-6-376 d. Because the dissenting judges correctly interpreted this statute, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In order to discern the meaning of the words of a statute, a court “must look at the context in which the statute was written, remembering at all times that ‘the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.’ Cit.” Busch v. State , 271 Ga. 591, 592 523 SE2d 21 1999. A probate court is not invested with broad “jurisdiction to try a person charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393 . . . .” OCGA § 40-6-376 d. Instead, it has limited jurisdiction to try some persons, but not others, who are charged with that crime. Whether the probate court meets the description contained in OCGA § 40-6-376 d “depends exclusively on the charge against the person.” State v. Perkins , supra at 858 Eldridge, J., dissenting. The determinative factor is whether the vehicular homicide charge is a felony under subsection a of OCGA § 40-6-393 or a misdemeanor under subsection b. OCGA § 40-13-21 a. Thus, the applicability of OCGA § 40-6-376 d to a probate court hinges on the distinction between felony and misdemeanor grades of vehicular homicide. Where, as here, a person is charged with felony vehicular homicide, the probate court does not have jurisdiction to try the person for that charge, and the code section’s restrictions on jurisdiction over underlying offenses apply.
This analysis is confirmed by the statute’s subsequent reference to a court’s lack of jurisdiction over any offense arising “out of the same conduct which led to said person’s being charged with a violation of Code Section 40-6-393 . . . .” Emphasis supplied. OCGA § 40-6-376 d. “The word ‘said,’ when used as an adjective, means ‘aforementioned.’ ” Aguilar v. State , 621 SW2d 781, 783 Tex. Crim. App. 1981. See also Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1337 7th ed. 1999. Thus, the statute narrowly divests a court of jurisdiction over certain underlying traffic offenses charged against the particular person whose vehicular homicide charge cannot also be considered by that court.
