Several months before the parties were married, they were involved in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. A year after the marriage, the parties separated and, just over a month later, Wife commenced this action against Husband, seeking a divorce in one count of her complaint and, in a separate count, damages for personal injuries allegedly arising from the motorcycle accident. Husband answered and simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss the damages claim based on the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The trial court converted that motion into one for summary judgment and denied it because while there was not any evidence of collusion or fraud, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of marital harmony to be protected. No divorce decree has been entered. The trial court certified its order for immediate review, and Husband filed an application for interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals, which transferred it to this Court on the basis that it involves our jurisdiction over divorce cases. We granted the application to consider the issues of appellate jurisdiction and the applicability of interspousal tort immunity. 1. “The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of . . . all divorce and alimony cases . . . .” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III 6. An appeal from the final judgment in a divorce case is within this Court’s jurisdiction even if the only issue is custody or some other issue ancillary to divorce and alimony. Ashburn v. Baker , 256 Ga. 507, 508 1 350 SE2d 437 1986. Unlike such cases, this appeal is interlocutory and involves only the issue of immunity from a tort claim which was joined with the divorce action. Where, as here, an appeal is not from a final judgment, but is interlocutory or is from a contempt or other subsequent order, and the sole issue on appeal involves only a contract or tort claim or any matter other than divorce or alimony, then the appeal does not constitute a divorce or alimony case within the meaning of our state constitution. Crotty v. Crotty , 219 Ga. App. 408, 409 465 SE2d 517 1995 where this Court transferred an appeal involving only claims for contract damages which the plaintiff had joined in a single pleading with a motion for contempt of a final divorce judgment; Morgan v. Morgan , 193 Ga. App. 302, 303 2 388 SE2d 2 1989 where this Court transferred an appeal involving a motion to set aside the damages in a tort judgment for fraudulent inducement to marry, even though the tort claim was part of a complaint for divorce or annulment. See also Schmidt v. Schmidt , 270 Ga. 461, 462 2 510 SE2d 810 1999 holding that family violence actions are neither divorce nor alimony cases within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution, even though they often arise in conjunction with a divorce action; Durham v. Spence , 229 Ga. 835 195 SE2d 23 1972 cases involving only issues relating to a bond in the context of a divorce case are not in this Court’s jurisdiction; Arnold v. Arnold , 217 Ga. 430 122 SE2d 734 1961 appeal in an action on a contract for the payment of alimony is not an alimony case within the state constitutional provision; McClung v. McClung , 211 Ga. 823 89 SE2d 165 1955 same as Durham ; Thomas v. Hubert , 208 Ga. 72 65 SE2d 155 1951 rule for contempt was captioned in a divorce and injunction proceeding, but did not raise any question involving equity or divorce.
Wife contends that this appeal comes within our appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues. However, she does not specify any statute as allegedly unconstitutional, and argues only that interspousal tort immunity is unconstitutional as applied. Ledford v. J.M. Muse Corp. , 224 Ga. 617 163 SE2d 815 1968. Moreover, the trial court’s order does not contain any ruling on any constitutional issue. New v. Hubbard , 206 Ga. App. 679, 681 3 426 SE2d 379 1992. Accordingly, Wife’s constitutional argument is not a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Marr v. Ga. Dept. of Educ. , 264 Ga. 841 452 SE2d 112 1995; Ledford v. J.M. Muse Corp. , supra.
