In Phillips v. State , 275 Ga. 595 571 SE2d 361 2002, we affirmed Eric Phillips’ convictions and sentences for murder and related offenses, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After conducting the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding no merit in the claim. Phillips appeals from that order. To prevail, Phillips must show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that the trial would have had a different outcome. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 1984. In making those showings, he must overcome the strong presumption that the lawyer’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Rucker v. State , 271 Ga. 426, 427 520 SE2d 693 1999. That presumption of reasonable performance was reenforced in this case by the attorney’s own testimony at the hearing. Having heard all of the evidence, the trial court found that Phillips’ constitutional right to effective defense counsel had not been violated, and, on appellate review, ” ‘we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts. Cit.’ Cit.” Boyd v. State , 275 Ga. 772, 776 3 573 SE2d 52 2002.
a Phillips urges that the lawyer should have challenged for cause a prospective juror on the ground of bias in favor of the prosecution. See Phillips v. State , supra at 596 2. According to counsel, his inaction was a strategic decision based upon the colloquy between the trial court and the juror. In his opinion, the questioning demonstrated that the trial court “rehabilitated the juror to its satisfaction. In light of that, I would have viewed . . . a challenge for cause as a waste of time because the Court had already indicated in its questions that it was satisfied with his answers.” The trial court agreed with this assessment, finding that the juror did not display a definite and fixed opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of defendant, nor did he indicate an inability or unwillingness to listen to the evidence, apply the law, deliberate with fellow jurors and/or reach a verdict. Therefore, there was no basis for the Court to strike him for cause and no requirement for trial counsel to make an unfounded motion to do so. The reasonableness of an attorney’s conduct is viewed as of the time of trial and under the circumstances of the case. Berry v. State , 267 Ga. 476, 479 4 480 SE2d 32 1997. Whether a prospective juror is subject to a challenge for cause is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Corza v. State , 273 Ga. 164, 166 3 539 SE2d 149 2000. Considered from the perspective of voir dire and not from hindsight, the circumstances clearly authorized counsel to conclude that the trial court had exercised its discretion and determined that the juror was not disqualified on account of bias. Since an effort to strike the juror would have been unsuccessful, the attorney was not deficient for failing to make the losing motion to do so. See Whitaker v. State , 275 Ga. 521, 525 7 a 570 SE2d 317 2002; Hufstetler v. State , 274 Ga. 343, 346 3 553 SE2d 801 2001.
