The Superior Court of Newton County held Donald Norred in contempt of a “Stalking1 Six Month Protective Order” entered to protect his neighbor, Chris Moore. Norred appeals, contending the trial court erred in ordering him jailed until he paid a certain sum, ordering him jailed unconditionally for five weekends, and ordering him to vacate his home. As explained below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. The record shows the following proceedings. The underlying protective order, entered August 1, 2002, directed Norred to have no contact with Moore and “to receive appropriate psychiatric or psychological services.” The order also awarded Moore “costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $500,”2 but gave Norred no deadline for payment. On December 12, 2002, Moore filed a motion for contempt, alleging Norred had “wilfully failed to comply with the Court’s Order by failing to pay costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $500.” After a hearing, the trial court entered the appealed order on February 21, 2003, finding Norred in contempt of the August 1, 2002 order for failing to pay the $500 in costs and attorney fees, for wilfully refusing to receive appropriate psychiatric or psychological services, and for continuing to harass and intimidate Moore, “by continuing to approach the fence which separates the parties’ property as well as making unwarranted emergency 911 calls regarding” Moore. The trial court ordered Norred jailed “until such time that he purges himself of the contempt by making payment to the Newton County Sheriff’s Department for the following particulars: a Norred shall pay $500 . . . toward court costs and attorney’s fees as directed in the Stalking Six Month Protective Order dated August 1, 2002; . . . b Norred shall pay $590 . . . toward the costs and attorney’s fees in the present contempt action; c Norred shall pay $450 toward costs and attorneys fees in the above-styled action.” The trial court also unconditionally ordered Norred jailed for five consecutive weekends. Finally, the trial court ordered Norred to “immediately vacate” his home, allowing him only “to return to the premises for the purpose of retrieving his belongings and materials.”
Because the trial court imposed both conditional and unconditional punishments, this case involves both civil and criminal contempt,3 which are each subject to a different standard of review. On appeal of a criminal contempt conviction the appropriate standard of appellate review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil contempt appeals, if there is any evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that its order had been violated, we are without power to disturb the judgment absent an abuse of discretion. Footnotes and punctuation omitted. In re Waitz , 255 Ga. App. 841, 842 567 SE2d 87 2002.
