Carriage Hills Associates, Inc. and Walton Ventures, Inc. appeal from the judgments on a jury verdict in these related cases arising from condemnation by the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia MEAG of an easement across their property. Appellants, which are owned by the same individual and represented by the same counsel, tried the cases together and filed identical appellate briefs asserting the same four enumerations of error. Finding no error, we affirm. 1. Appellants first complain that the trial court erred in granting MEAG’s motion in limine seeking to exclude expert testimony regarding potential commercial outparcels and apartment units that did not exist as of the date of taking.1 In the same enumeration, appellants complain that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with regard to this issue. But the trial court did not grant the motion in limine. After pretrial argument, the trial court stated, “I will have to allow it all . . . . I can’t hold this evidence out.” To the extent that appellants argue in their brief that the trial court excluded such evidence during the course of the trial, we note that the testimony of appellants’ experts and their principal with respect to the potential value of development not yet in existence was admitted at trial over MEAG’s repeated objections.
During the presentation of evidence, the trial court sustained MEAG’s objection to the introduction on cross-examination of a plat showing an anchor building and out parcels, stating that it was doing so as part of the motion in limine. But the motion in limine sought to exclude expert testimony, not documentary evidence, and the trial court excluded the plat on the basis that it purported to show “that yes, that exists out there and that’s being impacted by this easement” and thus was unduly prejudicial. This ruling was correct under our holding in Dept. of Transp. v. Benton , 214 Ga. App. 221, 222 1 447 SE2d 159 1994: In all cases, the only question for decision is the value of property taken or consequential damages at the time of taking. The fact that the property is merely adaptable to a different use is not in itself a sufficient showing in law to consider such different use as a basis for compensation; it must be shown that such use of the property is so reasonably probable as to have an effect on the present value of the land. Even where a different use is shown to be reasonably probable, the jury cannot evaluate the property as though the new use were an accomplished fact ; the jury can consider the new use only to the extent that it affects the market value on the date of taking. Id. Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted; emphasis supplied. Moreover, the trial court’s subsequent instruction to the jury correctly distinguished between potential development in the future and structures already existing on the property. As we observed in Elliott v. Henry County Water Auth. , 238 Ga. App. 15, 17 4 517 SE2d 545 1999, “it is appropriate for a jury to be allowed to inquire into all legitimate purposes, capabilities and uses to which the property might be adapted, provided that such use is reasonable and probable and not remote or speculative .” See also Ga. Transmission Corp. v. Barron , 255 Ga. App. 645, 647 566 SE2d 363 2002.
