Rodney Barnett Collins was indicted on five counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, no proof of insurance, and driving with a suspended license. His motion to suppress evidence was denied. During Collins’s jury trial, the trial court granted a directed verdict as to the charge of no proof of insurance. The jury found Collins guilty of three counts of aggravated assault on a police officer, two counts of the lesser included offense of obstructing a police officer, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and driving with a suspended license. He appeals from the convictions and sentences entered thereon, contending that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence and violated OCGA § 17-8-57 by questioning State witnesses to aid the prosecution. We find no merit in Collins’s contentions and affirm the judgments. Construed to support the jury’s verdicts, the evidence showed that after receiving information from a confidential informant, agent Darren Singleton of Hall County’s Multi-Agency Narcotics Squad placed a recorded telephone call to Collins and listened while the informant made arrangements to buy crack cocaine from Collins at a particular location in Hall County. After the telephone call, Singleton played the tape back and listened to the entire conversation. Later, at the appointed time, Collins arrived at the arranged location at the specified time driving the make, model, and color car the agent was expecting. When Collins pulled in next to the informant’s car, agents surrounded his car with their unmarked vehicles and approached him wearing vests marked “police” or other identification. Collins immediately attempted to flee the scene as officers “were yelling stop, police over and over.” Instead of stopping, Collins began using evasive maneuvers in his car, during which he almost ran over Singleton and two other officers, actually striking one, and struck and damaged two of the officers’ vehicles. Before he was subdued and arrested, an agent saw him throw a plastic bag down. After the arrest, agents returned to pick up the plastic bag, which was a “corner baggie, clear plastic, containing several pieces of crushed crack cocaine.” Another piece of crack cocaine was found behind the driver’s side sun visor in Collins’s car .
1. Collins contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from Singleton regarding the information supplied by the confidential informant, which was hearsay because the informant did not testify. The trial court admitted this testimony to explain the officer’s conduct. In Momon v. State , 249 Ga. 865 294 SE2d 482 1982 and Teague v. State , 252 Ga. 534 314 SE2d 910 1984 our Supreme Court concluded that under OCGA § 24-3-2, hearsay is admissible to explain conduct when that conduct is a matter concerning which the truth must be found, but in “practically every case,” law enforcement officers’ conduct will not be a material issue. Id. at 536. Indeed, in Weems v. State , 269 Ga. 577 501 SE2d 806 1998, the court held that police conduct is not in issue even when it is “so inexplicable as to cast doubt on the prosecution, or a confidential informant has provided information which initiates an investigation.” Citations omitted. Id. at 579 2. We agree with Collins that here, as in Weems , it was error to admit the agent’s testimony regarding what he learned from the confidential informant. We cannot, however, agree with Collins that this error mandates reversal.
