In this divorce case, the appellant, Mary Pope, contends that the trial court erred in setting aside a judgment that had been entered in her favor against the appellee, Claud Pope. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm. Ms. Pope filed this divorce action against Mr. Pope in April 2001. Mr. Pope, who was not represented by counsel, was personally served with the petition for divorce, but did not file any responsive pleadings. The case subsequently was scheduled for trial, and Mr. Pope was not notified of the trial date. After the trial, at which Mr. Pope did not appear, the trial court entered a final judgment, awarding Ms. Pope the parties’ marital residence and all the personal property located therein. After the entry of the final judgment, the husband obtained counsel. Within the same term of court as the final judgment, the husband filed a motion to set aside the judgment, requesting that the court do so under its inherent power to control a judgment during the term in which it was entered. The trial court subsequently set aside the judgment, and after a bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment. The court awarded Ms. Pope the parties’ marital residence and most of the personal property located therein. The court awarded Mr. Pope a truck, some of the personal property located in the parties’ home, and $50,000 as his share of the equity in the marital residence. Ms. Pope has now filed this appeal, contending that the trial court erred in setting aside its initial judgment.
During the term in which a judgment is entered, a trial court has plenary control over it and has the discretion to set aside the judgment ” ‘for irregularity, or because it was improvidently or inadvertently entered’ “ 1 and ” ‘for the purpose of promoting justice.’ “ 2 A trial court’s discretion in setting aside a judgment will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused.3 However, a trial court’s discretion to set aside a judgment during the term it was entered is not without limits, and should be exercised for some meritorious reason.4 In this regard, a trial court is granted the discretion to determine what is a meritorious reason for setting aside one of its judgments, and an appellate court may reverse that discretion only if it is manifestly abused.5
