Appellant Margaret Moon filed a complaint for divorce in the Superior Court of Fayette County on June 27, 1997, and immediately moved to Kansas with the couple’s two children. Appellant was designated the temporary primary physical custodian of the children in an order filed in November 1997; appellee David Moon was awarded the temporary primary legal and physical custody of the children in December 2000. A bench trial took place May 17, 18, and June 22, 1999, and December 7 and 12, 2001. The final judgment and decree of divorce awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children to Mr. Moon, found Mrs. Moon to be an unfit parent, required her to pay child support of thirteen percent of her gross monthly income or at least $229.71 for each child,1 made her responsible for one-half of the children’s uninsured medical costs and all of the children’s uninsured psychiatric, psychological, or counseling expenses, required her to maintain life insurance policies of $25,000 payable to each child, and placed restrictions upon the exercise of the visitation awarded her.2 Mrs. Moon’s motion for new trial was denied by the trial court, and we granted her application for discretionary review of the trial court’s judgment. 1. Mrs. Moon contends the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to permit Mrs. Moon to present the expert testimony of the psychologist who treated the couple’s son. The trial court based its ruling on the fact that Mrs. Moon had not identified the psychologist as an expert she intended to call at trial in her responses to Mr. Moon’s interrogatories requesting such information. See OCGA § 9-11-26b4Ai. Generally, in order to obtain review of a ruling excluding testimony, it must be shown what testimony was expected of the witness. Anderson v. Jarriel , 224 Ga. 495 3 167 SE2d 138 1968. When the trial court announced that the expert would not be permitted to testify, Mrs. Moon did not make a proffer of the content of the excluded witness’s testimony. Having failed to show what testimony was expected of the witness, Mrs. Moon is not entitled to review of the trial court’s ruling excluding the testimony. Id.
2. Mrs. Moon next contends the trial court erred when it declined to hear the testimony of the couple’s 14-year-old daughter and 13-year-old son at the final hearing on the petition for divorce. OCGA § 19-9-1a3A provides that a child who has reached the age of 14 “shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child’s selection shall be controlling, unless the parent so selected is determined not to be a fit and proper person to have the custody of the child.” OCGA § 19-9-1a3B requires the trial court “to consider the desires, if any, and educational needs of the child who has reached the age of at least 11 but not 14 years in determining which parent shall have custody. . . .” The trial court based its ruling on Mrs. Moon’s failure to comply with Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.5 B, which requires leave of court in order for minor children of the parties to testify at a temporary hearing. Any error in failing to have heard from the children during the final hearing is rendered harmless by the trial court’s determination that Mrs. Moon was unfit, since the 14-year-old child’s statutory right to choose her custodial parent is not controlling when the parent chosen is declared unfit and the 13-year-old child’s statutory right to have his desires considered by the trial court is limited by the trial court’s statutory right to have complete discretion in assigning custody. Furthermore, we note that no proffer was made regarding the content of the children’s testimony.
