A jury found Fernando Harvell guilty of the following crimes: burglary of the home of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Wood; felony murder of Mr. Woods while in the commission of an aggravated assault; an alternative count of felony murder during an armed robbery of Mr. Woods; the two predicate felonies perpetrated against Mr. Woods; commission of an armed robbery and aggravated assault against Mrs. Woods; an aggravated assault and aggravated battery of her son, Charles Ballard; and, possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment for the homicide, after erroneously merging both underlying felonies into the single felony murder conviction. See Dunn v. State, 263 Ga. 343, 345 2 434 SE2d 60 1993. For the robbery and assault of Mrs. Woods, the trial court sentenced Harvell to two concurrent 20-year terms. For the aggravated assault and aggravated battery of Mr. Ballard, the trial court imposed a single concurrent 10-year sentence, but did not specify which conviction merged into the other. For the burglary and the drug offenses, the trial court sentenced appellant to two concurrent terms of 10 years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and Harvell appeals.1
1. When they entered the residence, Harvell was armed with a baseball bat and his accomplice, Telly Ranson, had a gun. During the course of robbing and assaulting Mr. Wood, Ranson fatally shot him. Appellant and Ranson also threatened Mrs. Woods with their weapons, and stole her watch. Appellant beat Mr. Ballard in the head with the bat, seriously injuring him. The next day, Harvell attempted to sell a revolver which was identified as the murder weapon. He also was overheard making incriminating admissions regarding his participation in the events. At the time of his arrest, appellant possessed cocaine. After initially invoking his right to counsel, he subsequently gave the police an inculpatory statement. Mrs. Woods and her son positively identified Harvell as one of the two men who committed the crimes. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the various offenses for which he was convicted and sentenced. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979.
