In early April of 1995, David V. Bowden, Kevin Mathews, Mathews Home Builders, Inc., and Mathews Custom Homes, Inc. Builders finished construction of a house for which they did not yet have a buyer. On April 26, 1995, the Chatham County Building Inspections Department completed its inspection process and, in July, 1995, issued a certificate of occupancy. Builders then conveyed the property to David and Kimberly Hickey Plaintiffs. After Plaintiffs discovered moisture damage under the house’s synthetic stucco cladding, they brought suit on April 26, 1999 against Builders and the manufacturer of the synthetic stucco, Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. Appellants. Plaintiffs asserted products liability claims as to Colormatch and, with respect to Builders, alleged negligent construction, breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants on the ground that the applicable statutes of limitation had expired. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have applied the six-year limitation period for contract actions to the claim for breach of implied warranty, and that the four-year statute of limitations for damage to realty did not preclude the remaining tort, fraud, and products liability claims. Hickey v. Bowden, 248 Ga. App. 647 548 SE2d 347 2001. The rationale for the latter conclusion was that the earliest date on which the house could be deemed substantially completed, so as to start the four-year period, was the date on which the certificate of occupancy was issued, at which time the house could be occupied legally. Hickey v. Bowden, supra at 650 2. In order to consider this holding, we granted certiorari in Case Number S01G1036 as to Colormatch and in Case Number S01G1063 as to Builders. We conclude that in those circumstances where, as here, a contractor makes improvements to his own real property for the express purpose of sale and the property actually is sold, the applicable period of limitations for claims of damage to realty does not begin to run until the initial sale of the improved property, regardless of the date of “substantial completion.” However, the limitations period begins to run against the manufacturer of materials necessary for the improvement on the date of substantial completion, which we hold is not dependent on the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Case Number S01G1036, but affirm in Case Number S01G1063 under the “right for any reason” principle. See Dental One Assoc. v. JKR Realty Assoc., 269 Ga. 616, 617 501 SE2d 497 1998.
1. The statute of limitations which is applicable to Plaintiffs’ tort claims, including their products liability claims, is found in OCGA § 9-3-30 a. Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. Nat. Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 366 1 368 SE2d 732 1988; Mitchell v. Contractors Specialty Supply, 247 Ga. App. 628, 629 544 SE2d 533 2001; Mitchell v. Jones, 247 Ga. App. 113, 115 2 541 SE2d 103 2000; Hanna v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 649 2 a 446 SE2d 741 1994. Compare OCGA § 9-3-30 b providing a special rule for synthetic stucco causes of action which do not expire before March 28, 2000; Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 1 304 SE2d 383 1983. OCGA § 9-3-30 a provides that “all actions for trespass upon or damage to realty shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.” See Daniel v. American Optical Corp., supra at 168 1 the similar language of OCGA § 9-3-33 demonstrates that the scope of its application “is determined by the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory underlying the claim for relief”.
