Darrien Cortez Harrison was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault. He appeals claiming the trial court erred by seating three jurors whom he had struck from the jury panel by use of peremptory jury strikes. Specifically, Harrison claims the trial court erred by granting the State’s challenge to the strikes brought pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69 1986, and Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42 112 SC 2348, 120 LE2d 33 1992, in which the State claimed that Harrison used the strikes to purposefully discriminate against the jurors on the basis of their race. For the reasons which follow, we conclude the jury which convicted Harrison was not properly constituted pursuant to the requirements of Batson and McCollum and that Harrison must be granted a new trial.
In McCollum, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the same principles set forth in Batson, precluding the State from racial discrimination in the use of peremptory jury strikes, also preclude a criminal defendant from using peremptory strikes to discriminate against jurors on the basis of race. In its challenge, the State contended that Harrison used all six of his peremptory strikes to remove Caucasian potential jurors on the basis of race. This challenge initiated a three step inquiry requiring: 1 that the State establish a prima facie case that the strikes were exercised with racially discriminatory intent; 2 if established, that the burden of production shifted to Harrison to tender race-neutral explanations for the strikes, and 3 if race-neutral explanations were tendered, that the trial court decide whether the State proved purposeful racial discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 767-769 115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834 1995; Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899 463 SE2d 699 1995. During this inquiry, the burden of persuasion as to discriminatory intent rests entirely with, and never shifts from, the State. Purkett, 514 U. S. at 768; Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509, 510 467 SE2d 562 1996.
