Appellant John R. Earl is a resident of Cherokee County who filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the “Family Court” established by a standing order issued pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1b2D by appellee Frank C. Mills, III, chief judge of the superior courts of the Blue Ridge Judicial Circuit, and the chief judges of the circuit’s state and juvenile courts, was illegal and unconstitutional, as were the appointments of two judges appointed to preside over the family court. In the standing order, the juvenile court, state court, and superior court judges provided for the creation of a “de facto ‘Family Court’ ” that required the permanent assistance of judges, to be provided by the juvenile court judges. The standing order set out that “ juvenile judges responding under this Request shall preside as superior court judges. . . .” In the standing order, the superior court judges agreed to a reassignment of certain classes of cases from state court to superior court. The order noted that the cases handled by the family court “shall have no jurisdictional separation from superior court, and no separate official docket need be kept.”
Appellant’s complaint alleged that the judicial action taken to create the family court violated Article VI, Section I, Para. VII of the Georgia Constitution which gives the legislature, not the judiciary, the authority to “abolish, create, consolidate, or modify judicial circuits and courts and judgeships. . . .” Appellant also contended the family court was unconstitutional since it is not among the classes of courts listed in the Georgia Constitution as those in which the judicial power of the State is vested exclusively. Ga. Const., 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I.1 The complaint also alleged that OCGA § 15-1-9.1b2D, the statute pursuant to which the standing order was issued, was unconstitutional in that it authorized members of the judicial branch to exercise power constitutionally reserved to the legislative and executive branches, and that OCGA § 15-1-9.1a3 was unconstitutionally vague and in conflict with § 15-1-9.1b2. Appellant sought injunctive relief to restrain and enjoin the existence and practice of the family court and to restrain and enjoin the judges sitting on the family court from exercising any authority as judges. The petition also sought from appellee an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11, and punitive damages. On appellee’s motion, the trial court applied the doctrine of judicial immunity and dismissed the claims for attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages. The claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were dismissed after the trial court found they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This appeal follows the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.
