The Congregation of Anshei Chesed, acting on behalf of the owner of a one-acre tract of land in Fulton County, filed an application with Fulton County for a use permit that would authorize use of the property, zoned residential and containing a single-family residence, as a place of worship. The Congregation also sought variances to alter a setback requirement and to delete an on-site parking requirement. The County’s planning staff recommended approval of the application, with conditions; the County’s planning commission recommended denial of the application. The Fulton County Board of Commissioners denied the application, and the Congregation filed a petition for mandamus and other equitable relief by which it sought a court order requiring the county to permit the land to be used for a house of worship.1 After concluding that the Congregation had a clear legal right to the relief requested and that the Board of Commissioners’ decision to deny the application was an arbitrary and discretionary decision that lacked any articulable objective ground of support, the trial court issued the writ of mandamus.2 The County timely filed an application for discretionary review. Citing Sprayberry v. Dougherty County, 273 Ga. 503 543 SE2d 29 2001, overruled in Ferguson v. Composite State Bd., 275 Ga. 255, 258 564 SE2d 715 2002, this Court issued an order in which we determined that the County had the right to directly appeal the trial court’s issuance of the writ of mandamus compelling the county to issue a special use permit, and granted the application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35j.3
1. It is incumbent upon this Court to inquire into its own jurisdiction. Collins v. AT&T, 265 Ga. 37 456 SE2d 50 1995; Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 1 452 SE2d 756 1995. A case filed in either appellate court that involves zoning must come by application when “it is an appeal from the decision of a court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35a1.” Trend Dev. Co. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425 1 383 SE2d 123 1989. In essence, this Court determined in Trend and its progeny that a zoning decision made by a local government was the action of a local administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 a1, and an appeal from a superior court decision reviewing the local administrative agency’s decision must come by way of application pursuant to § 5-6-35 a1. King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427 1 531 SE2d 350 2000; O.S. Advertising v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 7231 482 SE2d 295 1997. As has been made clear in Ferguson v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, supra, 275 Ga. 255 1, a party to the decision of an administrative agency may not avoid the requirements of filing an application to appeal in the appellate courts by filing in superior court an action from which a direct appeal is authorized by OCGA § 5-6-34. See Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 448 SE2d 192 1994; Crymes v. Smith, 260 Ga. 730 401 SE2d 11 1990appeal from superior court’s denial of mandamus following the decision of a local board of zoning appeals involves judicial review of an administrative decision and requires an application to appeal. The same principles hold true when a party wishes to appeal the superior court’s decision on a petition for mandamus that was filed after a local zoning decision because the local ordinance does not provide a means of judicial review of the zoning decision.4 Cf. Gwinnett County v. Ehler Enterprises, 270 Ga. 570 512 SE2d 239 1999.
