Mathis Air Park Subdivision “Air Park” was developed by L.G. Mathis and Patrick E. McLaughlin as a fly-in residential community where many residents own airplanes and have hangars on their property. See Mathis v. Durham, 269 Ga. 753 505 SE2d 724 1998. William R. Durham, Kathy Durham, George Gaddis, Howard Avery, Barbara Avery, Lisa L. McCrimmon, and Edward W. McCrimmon, property owners and residents of Air Park, filed the underlying petition for equitable relief, abatement of nuisance, injunction, and declaratory judgment against Mathis and McLaughlin, after the defendants erected a fence across Air Park Court, a gravel roadway in the subdivision used by many of the residents for vehicular traffic and taxiing airplanes to and from the nearby private airport. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that both existing roadways in the subdivision, Air Park Court and Air Park Road, were rights-of-way for the use and enjoyment of the property owners. They also sought injunctive relief requiring the defendants to remove the fence at issue and preventing the defendants from further obstructing the rights-of-way, as well as an award of attorney fees.1 The defendants filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs William and Kathy Durham’s easement over the roadway was for vehicular and pedestrian traffic only; that none of the plaintiffs had an express or implied easement allowing them to taxi propellor-driven aircraft on the roadways; and that the defendants could dedicate a portion of Air Park Road to Forsyth County. They amended their counterclaim to seek damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court issued an interlocutory injunction requiring the defendants to remove the fence they erected on Air Park Court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Mathis v. Durham, supra.
At issue in the present appeal is the trial court’s order on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. In that order, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs and found that the defendants’ fence constituted a taking of the right-of-way of those plaintiffs who own lots 6, 7, and 10, which are adjacent to Air Park Court. The court awarded partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of the length of Air Park Court, holding that the roadway, which was not a public road, extended from the intersection of Air Park Road to the southwest line of lots 6 and 9 on a plat of the subdivision dated September 23, 1983 the “1983 Plat. The court declared that the owner of the rental airplane hangars on lot 7 must have an entrance and exit for airplanes on Air Park Road, not on Air Park Court. Finally, the trial court declared that Air Park Road is a public road and that it may be used as a right-of-way for taxiing airplanes.
