On May 21, 1992, a DeKalb County jury convicted Donald C. Bankhead of felony murder,1 aggravated assault, kidnapping, and burglary. Pertinently, he was sentenced to ten years to serve on the kidnapping count. Thereafter, the superior court granted his motion for new trial, as amended, for the failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing under Uniform Superior Rule 31.3 B prior to the introduction of similar transactions evidence at trial. In August 1993, under the terms of his negotiated plea agreement, the defendant entered a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter reduced from felony murder,2 aggravated assault, kidnapping, and burglary. He was then sentenced concurrently to twenty years to serve on each count. The defendant appeals from the superior court’s order denying his pro se motion to vacate void judgment and motion for resentencing, as amended, variously contending that his sentence to twenty years confinement on the kidnapping count was illegal in that the superior court’s sentencing authority thereon was limited to ten years confinement as originally imposed in the first trial. In a related claim of error, the defendant challenges the effectiveness of counsel upon the entry of his guilty plea, arguing a that counsel wrongly advised him that the maximum permissible punishment for kidnapping was twenty years confinement despite the ten year sentence imposed thereon in his first trial, and b that counsel “induced” his plea by promising to represent him before the parole board and to have him released from prison within fifty-two months. Finding these claims of error to be without merit, we affirm.
1. Although it did so erroneously, characterizing defendant’s motion as a motion to modify sentence, the superior court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to vacate void judgment and motion for resentencing, as amended. See, e. g., Frederick v. State, 226 Ga. App. 540, 542 1 487 SE2d 107 1997 “We affirm a trial court’s ruling it if is right for any reason.”