In this case the appellant, Calvin Mann, appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals from his conviction for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, his third conviction for possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and his ninth felony conviction in all. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.1 We then granted certiorari to consider two questions. The first is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court was not required to sentence Mann to life in prison under OCGA § 17-10-7 a, the general felony recidivist statute, but instead had the discretion under OCGA § 16-13-30 d, the specific recidivist statute for certain drug offenses, to sentence Mann either to life in prison or to a term of not less than ten years nor more than 40 years in prison. The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mann was subject to general impeachment by means of a previous felony conviction that the State introduced as “other transaction” evidence in its case-in-chief. We conclude that the Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court had discretion in sentencing Mann under the specific recidivist provisions of § 16-13-30 d and was not required to sentence Mann to life in prison under the general recidivist provisions of § 17-10-7 a. We also conclude, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mann was subject to general impeachment by means of the previous conviction in question. Although we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in this regard, we conclude that the error was harmless, and we therefore affirm Mann’s conviction.
1. Mann was found guilty of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, his third conviction for the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute and his ninth felony conviction. The trial court sentenced Mann to life without parole as a recidivist. Before trial, the State had offered Mann a plea bargain with a sentencing recommendation of seven years, to serve two, and the balance on probation. Mann, however, rejected the plea bargain. In his motion for new trial, Mann contended that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he rejected the plea bargain due to his trial counsel’s failure to inform him that the only sentence he could receive if convicted was life without parole. In this regard, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel testified that he told Mann that he could be sentenced from a range of ten years to life in prison, and that, as an eight time recidivist, he would not be eligible for parole.
