We granted appellants-defendants William F. Johnson’s, Blue Tee Corporation’s, National Union Fire Insurance Company’s, and Southco Company of North Carolina’s application for interlocutory review of the DeKalb County State Court’s order denying their motion for partial summary judgment grounded upon the claim that appellees-plaintiffs Comcar Industries d/b/a Coastal Transport and Protective Insurance Company, its insurer, were not entitled to assert a subrogation claim in this workers’ compensation case. Pertinently, the instant case arises out of a motor vehicle collision in Dekalb County between Johnson and appellee-plaintiff-intervenor Richard S. Poe, a Comcar employee at the time of the accident. Poe was injured in the accident; however, because he then lived in Virginia, Protective paid Poe workers’ compensation benefits under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act.1 Subsequently, Comcar and Protective, as Poe’s subrogees, filed the instant action against Johnson, Blue Tee,2 National Union Fire Insurance, and Southco, seeking to recover the workers’ compensation benefits paid Poe in Virginia. Poe, in turn, voluntarily dismissed the damages action he had filed against Johnson, and, on February 4, 1999, the state court granted Poe’s motion to intervene herein. Johnson, Blue Tee, National Union, and Southco appeal the denial of their motion for partial summary judgment, contending that Georgia law bars the subrogation claim against them made by Comcar and Protection. Finding that the law of Georgia governs and that the plain meaning of OCGA § 34-9-11.1 b allows subrogee employers and their insurers to recover workers’ compensation benefits only to the extent that these have been paid injured employees under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act, we reverse.
Lex loci delictis, i. e. the place of the wrong, is the Georgia conflict of law rule here applicable. Maryland Casualty Ins. Co. v. Glomski, 210 Ga. App. 759, 760 437 SE2d 616 1993, citing Sargent Indus. v. Delta Air Lines, 251 Ga. 91, 93 303 SE2d 108 1983. Mindful of the foregoing, the state court notes, and the parties agree, that Georgia law governs any right to subrogation which Comcar and Protective may have in this case. In this regard, OCGA § 34-9-11.1 sets out the employer or insurer’s right to be subrogated to an employee’s claim against a third party tortfeasor in Georgia. Subsection b thereof provides:
